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Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy,
and Administrative Law
Glen Staszewski*
ABSTRACT: The role of "political reasons" in agency decision making has
tremendous importance for administrative law. The conventional wisdom
posits that an agency's policy decisions should be justified based on their
substantive merits, rather than the preferences of public officials or other
political considerations. Yet, the Supreme Court is closely divided on this
issue, and prominent commentators have relied on the political control
model of administrative law to argue that political reasons should play an
enhanced role in agency decision making and that the judiciary should give
agencies credit for justifying their policy choices on political grounds.
This Article argues that those scholarly proposals are fundamentally
misguided because political-control theories of administrative law are based
on untenable conceptions of democracy and implausible empirical
assumptions. It claims that deliberative theories of administrative legitimacy
provide a superior alternative but acknowledges that deliberative democratic
theorists have not provided a clear account of the proper role of political
preferences in agency decision making. After providing such an account,
this Article sets forth a concrete proposal for reforming administrative law
that would improve the transparency of the administrative process and
allow agencies to incorporate political considerations into their decision
making, consistent with the basic principles of deliberative democratic
theory. This Article also identifies several reasons to be wary of any reform
proposal that would embrace a greater role for political reasons in agency
decision making, and concludes that the best way of promoting agency
legitimacy and deliberative democracy may be to retain the existing version
of hard-look judicial review.
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Mulligan, and Sid Shapiro for excellent comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this
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Meeting of the Law and Society Association and faculty workshops at The University of Kansas
School of Law and Michigan State University College of Law. Finally, I would like to thank
Justin Bratt, Chaoyi Ding, and Matt Martin for very helpful research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Should the legality of a regulatory agency's policy decisions be
strengthened by an agency's assertion that it was following the preferences
of the President or members of Congress? Since the Supreme Court
articulated the standard formulation of the arbitrary and capricious
standard of judicial review in its landmark decision in the State Farm case,,
agencies, courts, and commentators have almost uniformly assumed a
negative answer to this question.z Rather, the validity of agency decision
making has been understood to turn on technical considerations and other
factors that focus on the reasonableness of any agency's decisions on the
merits. Accordingly, agencies have generally declined to provide "political
reasons" for their discretionary decisions, and courts have had few occasions
to review them, even though there are good reasons to think that political
considerations frequently influence agency decision making.
Meanwhile, administrative law theory is widely understood to have
shifted toward a model of legitimacy that emphasizes the importance of
political control of agency decision making by the President (or other
elected officials).3 The presidential control model of agency legitimacy has
been reflected in a number of the Supreme Court's most important
administrative law decisions over the past quarter century, including the
Chevron decision, which explicitly endorsed the notion that executive branch
agencies could "properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments."4 Partly as a result of this major
transformation in administrative law theory and doctrine, several prominent
commentators have recently argued that political reasons should play a
larger and more transparent role in administrative decision making and that
the judiciary should give agencies credit for providing political reasons for
their policy decisions in a variety of contexts.5 In recent decisions, the
1. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
2. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, i 19
YALE L.J. 2, 14-32 (2009).
3. See id. at 35; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 485-92 (2003) (describing the
presidential control model and claiming that it has become the "dominant" model of the
administrative state); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 988 (1997) ("Increasingly, scholars (and, at times, the
judiciary) look to the President not only to improve the managerial competence and efficiency
with which regulation occurs but also, and more deeply, to supply the elusive essence of
democratic legitimation.").
4. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); see
alsoJody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP.
CT. REV. 51, 92 (recognizing that Chevron arguably "endorsed the notion that political
considerations could lawfully influence agency policy decisions").
5. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making, s o8
MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1173-75 (2010); Watts, supra note 2, at 32-45; see also RichardJ. Pierce,Jr.,
20O1 21] 85 1
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Supreme Court has been closely divided over the extent to which political
reasons can justify an agency's discretionary policy choices.6 Considering
that the newestJustice, Elena Kagan, was an early advocate of giving agencies
credit for relying on political reasons for their policy decisions,7 this is an
issue that the Court may be interested in addressing again in the near
future.
This Article accepts the proposition that administrative agencies should
be given credit for justifying their policy decisions with political reasons
under the presidential control model. It claims, however, that this model of
administrative legitimacy is fundamentally misguided because policymaking
in a democracy is not, and should not try to be, purely majoritarian; and
even if we wanted policy decisions to reflect the pre-political preferences of
the people, relying on elected officials to control the discretionary policy
choices of administrative agencies could not plausibly be expected to
produce this outcome. This Article contends that a deliberative theory of
administrative legitimacy provides a more effective means to a more
attractive end from the standpoint of democracy. It acknowledges, however,
that deliberative democratic theorists have generally failed to provide a clear
account of the precise role of political preferences in agency decision
making.
This Article therefore assesses the appropriate role of political reasons
in agency decision making from the perspective of deliberative democratic
theory. It proceeds to set forth a concrete proposal for reforming
administrative law that would improve the transparency of the administrative
process and allow agencies to incorporate political reasons into their
decision making, consistent with the basic principles of deliberative
democratic theory. This Article also acknowledges, however, that a
deliberative perspective would recognize that it may be better to stick with
the status quo on the grounds that we do not want to encourage agencies to
give greater weight to political reasons. Political reasons will exert more than
enough weight as things stand. If we openly embrace those influences, they
What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision., 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 72-73
(claiming that agencies should be able to rely on any logically relevant factor that is not
precluded from consideration by statute in making their decisions).
6. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 18oo (2009); Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007); infra Part I (discussing these decisions).
7. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV, L. REV. 2246, 2380 (2001)
(advocating a relaxation in "the rigors of hard look review when demonstrable evidence shows
that the President has taken an active role in, and by so doing has accepted responsibility for,
the administrative decision in question"). Dean Christopher Edley was another early advocate
of giving agencies credit for relying on political reasons during judicial review. CHRISTOPHER F.
EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 190-92
(199o) (advocating "a judicial insistence that agencies frankly acknowledge the role of political,
ideological, or subjective analyses in their reasons and findings," and suggesting that courts
should give credit to politics "as an acceptable and even desirable element of decision making"
in appropriate circumstances).
852 [Vol. 97:849
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will be likely (1) to predominate agency decision making and thereby
undermine the underlying goals of many statutory programs, (2) to alter the
accepted role of administrators (and their own self-definition) in very
damaging ways, and (3) to give politically appointed officials within agencies
even more power over the career staff and civil servants who are most likely
to possess technical expertise and to engage in reasoned deliberation about
the best ways to solve our most difficult collective problems. Accordingly,
this Article closes by considering whether we should ultimately recognize a
limited role for political reasons in administrative law or affirmatively
embrace the existing version of hard-look judicial review.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM
Administrative agencies are routinely delegated broad discretionary
authority to implement federal programs in the modern regulatory state. It
is therefore fundamentally important for agency employees and other public
officials to understand what considerations can permissibly be taken into
account when agencies make policy decisions-and, more to the point, how
agencies can justify the validity of their discretionary policy choices.8
Although an agency's governing statute will sometimes identify certain
factors that shall or shall not be taken into consideration, there will almost
always be a host of other logically relevant considerations that are not
specifically addressed by the agency's statutory mandate.9 Moreover, while
Congress typically gives agencies broad instrumental goals to achieve, it is
generally understood that agencies will be pursuing those goals in a highly
political environment.o Not only are agencies dependent upon elected
officials for their budgets, but their leaders are appointed (and can
frequently be removed) by elected officials, and they are subject to other
forms of political oversight." The extent to which agencies can justify their
policy decisions based on political reasons is therefore of tremendous
practical importance.
8. See Pierce, supra note 5, at 67 ("It is hard to imagine any administrative law issue more
basic than identifying the factors that an agency must, can, and cannot consider in making a
decision.").
9. See id. at 72-75 (providing a variety of examples and claiming that "[t]he list of goals
and purposes shared by most members of the public and by most members of Congress is far
longer than any list of decisional factors Congress has included, or could include, in any single
statute").
so. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1669, 1671 n-5 (1975) ("Most administrative agencies act in a highly charged field of political
forces which include the legislature, other executive bodies and officials, and a variety of more
or less well-organized political, social and economic groups and interests.").
is. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS 45-49, 84-98,
524-40 (5 th ed. 2009) (discussing means of legislative and executive control or oversight).
12. 1 will explain more precisely what I mean by "political reasons" at the end of this Part.
For now, it is useful to equate this term with the political preferences of elected officials.
8532o012]
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Given the practical importance of the issue, it is somewhat surprising
that the state of the law on this question can best be described as unsettled.
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the Supreme Court reviewed the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration's ("NHTSA") decision to rescind a
rule that would have required car manufacturers to install passive restraints
in new motor vehicles.'s Because the decision was made shortly after Ronald
Reagan was elected President, the "(de)regulatory philosophy" of his
administration would surely have provided a plausible explanation for the
agency's change of course.14 Nonetheless, the Court ignored this political
context and invalidated the agency's decision under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") based on NHTSA's failure to provide a reasoned
explanation for its decision on the merits.'s The Court explained:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.' 6
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion pointed out that "[t]he agency's
changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new
President of a different political party," and suggested that "[a] change in
administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and
benefits of its programs and regulations."'7 Because the Court ignored this
aspect of Justice Rehnquist's opinion, however, most agencies, courts, and
commentators have understood State Farm to reject the notion that political
reasons can justify an agency's discretionary policy choices under the
arbitrary and capricious standard ofjudicial review.,'
Despite the conventional understanding of State Farm, Richard Pierce
has recently argued that until the past few years, the Supreme Court and the
D.C. Circuit have both followed a consistent approach to the question of
which factors "an agency must, can, and cannot consider in making a
13. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1983).
14. Kagan, supra note 7, at 2382.
15. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34, 41-44.
16. Id. at 4 3.
17. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. See Watts, supra note 2, at ig (explaining that State Farm "has been widely read over
time to represent the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of politics").
854 [Vol. g7:849
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decision."'9 This approach essentially allowed agencies to consider any
"logically relevant decisional factor" that is not precluded from
consideration by statute when making a decision.2o Because Pierce would
consider the political preferences of elected officials a logically relevant
factor in most situations,- this reading of the case law would presumably
allow agencies to rely upon political reasons for their decisions on a regular
basis.22 It is not clear, however, whether this reading of the case law is correct
with respect to the validity of an agency's reliance on political reasons
because agencies have generally accepted the conventional understanding
of State Farm, and they have therefore declined to provide political
justifications for their decisions as a matter of course.'s As a result, federal
courts have had very few occasions to assess the extent to which agencies can
justify the validity of their policy choices based on political reasons.
Nonetheless, as Professor Pierce points out, several recent Supreme
Court decisions have significantly muddied the waters.24 In Massachusetts v.
EPA, a bare majority of the Court invalidated the agency's denial of a
petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles's
based on a "laundry list" of nonstatutory policy reasons, including a
professed desire to rely upon voluntary executive branch programs,'2 avoid
impairing "the President's ability to negotiate emissions reductions with 'key
ig. Pierce, supra note 5, at 67.
20. Id. at 72-73.
2 1. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Response, Presidential Control Is Better Than the Alternatives, 88
TEX. L. REv. SEE ALSO 113, 121-24 (2009) (claiming that administrative agencies should
consider a host of political factors in making any important decision).
22. Cf Watts, supra note 2, at 45-52 (exploring Congress's intent regarding political
factors, discussing the relevant case law, and advocating a presumption "that when Congress is
silent on the matter, Congress intended agencies to be able to consider all factors that are
rationally and logically relevant to the agency's decision, including certain political
influences").
23. See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1 155-5; Watts, supra note 2, at 23-29.
24. Pierce, supra note 5, at 77-88 (describing and criticizing these decisions, which
include Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009), Nat'1Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007), and Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)); cf
Stephen M. Johnson, Disclosing the President's Role in Rulemaking A Critique of the Reform Proposals,
60 CATH. U. L. REv. 1003, 1028 (2011 ) (analyzing recent Supreme Court decisions on the role
of nonstatutory factors in agency decision making, and claiming that (1) "agencies should be
able to consider factors that are not explicitly listed in statutes, as long as they are relevant to
the factors and standards set forth in the statute as the basis for agency decision making"; (2)
"agencies should be able to consider political influences and factors [in their decision-making]
as long as those factors are relevant to the statutory factors and standards"; and (3) "agencies
cannot rely on political influences and factors to justify a decision when those considerations
disregard the factors or standards [for decision-making] set forth in a statute").
25. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528-35 (invalidating the EPA's decision on the
grounds that it "rest[ed] on reasoning divorced from the statutory text").
26. Id. at 53 3.
2012] 855
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developing nations,"7 and allow the President to develop a more
comprehensive approach to the climate change issue.' 8 In contrast, Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion argued that there was no legal basis for rejecting
the agency's rationale, and claimed that "[t]he reasons EPA gave are surely
considerations executive agencies regularly take into account (and ought to
take into account) when deciding whether to consider entering a new field:
the impact such entry would have on other Executive Branch programs and
on foreign policy."29 More recently, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the
Justices were equally divided on whether "significant political pressure from
Congress" is a factor that can help to justify an agency's policy decisions
under the APA.3o Although lower federal courts have only had a few
opportunities to address the extent to which agencies can justify their policy
decisions based on political reasons, they have expressed significant
differences of opinion on the matter as well.3'
Not only is the role of political reasons in agency decision making a
matter of great practical importance and sharp legal disagreement, but this
particular issue goes to the very heart of what distinguishes the leading
contemporary theories of legitimacy in the modern regulatory state. In this
regard, the "political control model" focuses on the ability of elected officials
to supervise and control the discretionary policy choices of regulatory
agencies as the basis for democratic legitimacy.s The central idea is that if
agencies are following the preferences of elected officials who are politically
accountable to voters, then agency policy decisions will be democratically
legitimate because they will presumably reflect the will of the people and
achieve the consent of the governed.33 The political control model is based
upon a majoritarian or pluralistic conception of democracy, which reflects a
"belief in the hegemony of popular control of all governmental decisions."34
27. Id. (quoting 68 Fed. Reg. 52932 (2003)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 552 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
3o. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 18oo (2009). Compare id. at 1815-16
(Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("[Tihe precise policy change at issue here was spurred by
significant political pressure from Congress."), with id. at 1832 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(questioning the notion that the APA authorizes agencies "to change major policies on the basis
of nothing more than political considerations or even personal whim").
31. Compare UAW v. Chao, 361 F-3 d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (Pollak, J., concurring)
(arguing that "[t]here is nothing obscure, and nothing suspect" about "a change in regulatory
policy coincident with a change in administration"), with Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d
519, 544-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (invalidating the FDA's decision to place an age restriction on
over-the-counter Plan B contraceptives due to improper political influence).
32. See Watts, supra note 2, at 35.
33. See, e.g., McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
EcoNoMics 1651, 1663 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Matthew C.
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REv- 53, 56-58 (2008).
34. Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531,
538 (1998), quoted in Bressman, supra note 3, at 478.
[Vol. 97:849856
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The model also exemplifies an "aggregative" view of democracy, whereby the
primary role of the government is merely to ascertain and implement the
pre-political preferences of its citizens.35 This conception of democracy
privileges political power, either in the form of numerical majorities or
other forms of coercive influence.
In contrast, a "deliberative model" of administrative legitimacy focuses
on the obligation of public officials to engage in reasoned deliberation on
which courses of action will promote the public good.s6 Agency officials
must engage in a decision-making process that considers all of the relevant
interests and perspectives,37 and they must provide reasoned explanations
for their decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal
citizens with fundamentally competing perspectives38 Agency decisions
35. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 13-15
(2004) (describing the fundamental differences between aggregative and deliberative
conceptions of democracy).
36. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
97, 104 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) ("Because there are powerful norms against naked appeals to
interest or prejudice [in a deliberative setting], speakers have to justify their proposals by the
public interest."); Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political
Science, i1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI 497, 498 (2oo8) (explaining that a reason-giving requirement is
"[a]t the core of all theories of deliberative democracy"); id. at 504 (explaining that reason
giving must be "directed toward the collective good of the group that will be bound by the
decision"). Deliberative democracy's emphasis on the public good is a legacy of civic republican
theory. See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process in the Administrative
State, 46 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 126) ("Republicanism asserts that all
governments bear a basic obligation to advance the good of their people as a whole-res
publica-rather than their own self-interest or the factional interests of particular groups or
individuals."); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1530 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985).
37. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE
ENDS OF POLICY 213 (2002) (claiming that the legitimacy of decision making is enhanced "if
(i) the process of debate allows for a fair hearing of all; (2) the process is contrived in such a
way that majorities . .. need to take account of the views of the others; and (3) the formulation
of alternatives and the process of debate is conducted in a way that encourages reasonable
compromise among all participants, who may thus view themselves as cooperatively engaged in
a process of determining 'what we should do'"); see also Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and
Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17, 22-23 (Alan
Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989) (claiming that the public policies adopted by a majority can
only be legitimate if the minority's interests and perspectives were adequately considered
during the decision-making process and the prevailing outcome is one that "could be the object
of a free and reasoned agreement among equals"); Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political
Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 359-60 (1987) (explaining that the principle of majority rule
is only justified if "[t]he decision results from a [deliberative] process in which the minority
point of view was also taken into consideration").
38. For influential statements of this requirement, see AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 52-94 (1996); id. at 55 (describing a principle of
"reciprocity," which requires citizens and officials to "appeal to reasons or principles that can be
shared by fellow citizens who are similarly motivated" when they "make moral claims in a
deliberative democracy"); Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY,
2012 ] 857
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adopted pursuant to these criteria are democratically legitimate because
each interest and perspective is treated with equal respect and arbitrary
decision making is prohibited.ss A deliberative model of administrative
legitimacy is based upon broader theories of deliberative democracy, which
seek to eliminate arbitrary governmental action and reach the best decisions
on the merits in light of the available information and fundamental
differences of opinion.4o
While these two competing models plainly coexist, it is generally
understood that the prevailing theory of legitimacy in administrative law for
the past quarter century has been the "presidential control model,"4' a
version of the political control model. As Lisa Bressman has explained,
"[T]he presidential control model seeks to ensure that administrative policy
decisions reflect the preferences of the one person who speaks for the entire
nation."42 Because the President is the only nationally elected official in the
United States, his decisions will presumably reflect the preferences of a
majority of the electorate.4s If the President strays from the people's will, he
supra note 36, at 185, 193-94 (describing a deliberative process in which participants regard
one another as free, equal, and reasonable "in that they aim to defend and criticize institutions
and programs in terms of considerations that others, as free and equal, have reason to accept,
given the fact of reasonable pluralism and on the assumption that those others are themselves
concerned to provide suitable justifications"); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 773 (1997) ("A citizen engages in public reason . . . when he or she
deliberates within a framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the most reasonable
political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others, as free
and equal citizens might also reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse,").
39. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1291 (2009);
see id. at 1282-84 (discussing the capacity of reason giving to promote the legitimacy of
governmental authority in a democracy); Thompson, supra note 36, at 502 ("[L]egitimacy ...
prescribes the process by which ... collective decisions can be morallyjustified to those who are
bound by them. It is the key defining element of deliberative democracy.").
40. See, e.g., RICHARDSON, supra note 37, at 17 (seeking to develop a conception of public
reasoning that would "reconcile administrative discretion with democratic control in such a way
as to prevent bureaucratic power from being exercised arbitrarily"); see also GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 199-229; PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT 31-32 (David Miller & Alan Ryan eds., 1997) (distinguishing "freedom as
non-domination" from "freedom as non-interference," and explaining that the republican
tradition understands "exposure to the arbitrary will of another, or living at the mercy of
another, as the great evil"); Cohen, supra note 38, at 185-
41. See Stephenson, supra note 33, at 57 ("The notion that one can increase the political
responsiveness of bureaucratic decisions by increasing the influence of the most politically
responsive decision maker commands widespread acceptance."); Watts, supra note 2, at 35
(claiming that the political control model "has . . . gained widespread acceptance" since the
i980s, and recognizing that "[m]ost scholars see political control of the administrative state as
resting with the President due to the unique role he plays in overseeing agency action"); supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
42. Bressman, supra note 3, at 490, quoted in Staszewski, supra note 39, at 1260 (describing
these aspects of the presidential control model).
43. See Stephenson, supra note 33, at 59 (recognizing that the premises of the political
control model "imply the need for presidential control over bureaucratic policymaking,
[Vol. g7:849858
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(or his party) can be held politically accountable at the next election.44
From this perspective, Congress's delegation of broad policymaking
authority to regulatory agencies, which would otherwise be difficult to
square with the constitutional structure, can be legitimized if agency
decisions are subject to the control of the Chief Executive who is politically
accountable to all of the nation's voters.
If the fundamental goal of administrative law is to ensure that the policy
choices of agencies are subject to the control of the President and ultimately
reflect his preferences, it would be strange if agencies were precluded by law
from expressly justifying their policy choices on this very basis. Rather than
ignoring the fact that NHTSA rescinded its mandate for car manufacturers
to install passive restraints based on the preferences of the Reagan
Administration45 (or that President Clinton directed the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") to regulate the marketing and sale of tobacco to
minors, to cite another well-known example),46 the political reasons for
these policy decisions should be of the utmost importance to the judiciary.
After all, an agency's statement that it made a discretionary policy choice
based on a presidential directive or because "it was what the President
wanted" would appear to provide the ideal form of legitimacy under this
model. The agency's willingness to attribute potentially controversial policy
decisions to the President would also improve the electorate's ability to hold
the President politically accountable for those choices. It is therefore not
surprising that prominent commentators, such as Nina Mendelson and
Kathryn Watts, have invoked the presidential control model (or the political
control model more broadly) to argue that administrative agencies should
be given "credit" for providing political reasons for their policy decisions
under the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.47 The
because the president is the institutional actor most responsive to the preferences of a national
majority"); see also Bressman, supra note 3, at 490 (describing this aspect of the presidential
control model); id. at 490 n.145 (citing sources that endorse this view).
44. Bressman, supra note 3, at 491.
45. See Watts, supra note 2, at 6-7 (discussing this example).
46. Id. at 23-24 (discussing this example); see also Steven P. Croley, Public Interested
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 66-75 (2000) (describing the development of the FDA's
initiative to regulate tobacco and the importance of White House support).
47. See Watts, supra note 2, at 33 ("[A]llowing agencies to unapologetically disclose
political influences and enabling courts to credit openly political judgments would help to
bring hard look review, which currently hinges on an outmoded model of 'expert'
decisionmaking, into harmony with other major administrative law doctrines that embrace the
more current 'political control' model."). While Professor Mendelson is not as strongly
committed to the political control model, she recognizes that when value judgments are at
stake, "many theorists and the Supreme Court have suggested that some level of presidential
supervision can be critical and can make agency action more legitimate than if the agency acted
alone"; and her article is consistent with this premise. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1 146; see also
Kagan, supra note 7, at 2380 ("A revised doctrine [of hard-look judicial review] would
acknowledge and, indeed, promote an alternative vision centered on the political leadership
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problem, however, is that the political control model of administrative
legitimacy is fundamentally misguided.
Before proceeding any further, it is important to provide a working
definition of the term "political reasons." Professors Mendelson and Watts
both define political reasons as any reasons that emanate from elected officials or
high-level members of their staffs.48 This definition has the virtue of simplicity,
but it is also problematic because it plainly encompasses reasons that focus
directly on the merits of the policy issues facing agencies. For example, the
President might oppose the adoption of a costly and burdensome regulatory
requirement on the grounds that the agency's proposed rule would not
accomplish its stated objectives (and the White House might even provide
valid studies to support its position). Not only would an agency's reliance on
these political reasons be entirely unproblematic (from virtually any
theoretical perspective), but the agency would be legally obligated to
consider those reasons if they were set forth in the administrative record.
Existing law does not (and should not) preclude agencies from considering
these political reasons, orjustifying their decisions on these bases.
As discussed below, however, one place where advocates of political-
control theories and deliberative democratic theories tend to part ways is on
the importance of the fact that particular views on the merits were articulated
by elected officials or high-level members of their staffs. A related debate focuses on
the extent to which agencies should consider and rely upon political reasons
that are further removed from the merits of an agency's policy decisions.
These political reasons, which are more accurately characterized as "political
preferences" or "political priorities," include statements from elected
officials (or their staffs) of the following nature: "this is what I want," "this is
what my supporters want," "this is what the majority wants," "this will help
me win an election," "this is what I promised during my campaign," "this is
more consistent with my philosophy," and "this will best advance my
priorities." While distinguishing between political reasons that directly
address the merits of a policy decision and those that reflect more tangential
political preferences or priorities presents line-drawing problems that are
avoided by Mendelson's and Watts's definition, this Article focuses on
whether administrative agencies can justify their policy decisions based on
political reasons that fall within this latter category because their normative
and accountability provided by the President"); Pierce, supra note 21, at 113 ("1 support the
presidential-control model because I believe that it is better than the alternatives.").
48. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1128 (defining political reasons to include the views of
members of Congress and reasons "contributed by or adhered to by the President and the
politically appointed executive officials who oversee the administrative process and who answer
most closely to the President"); Watts, supra note 2, at 8-9 (defining political influences as
"influences aimed at agencies coming from executive and legislative actors, including the
President, members of Congress, and those who speak for and act for the President (such as the
President's Chief of Staff and the head of the Office of Management and Budget)").
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status is deeply controversial under both existing law and theories of
democratic legitimacy.
II. THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL CONTROL
This Part claims that the political control model of administrative
legitimacy is a poor means to the wrong end from the standpoint of
democracy. First, it claims that policymaking in a constitutional democracy is
not, and should not try to be, purely majoritarian. Second, it contends that
even if we wanted policy decisions to reflect the pre-political preferences of
the people, relying on elected officials to control the discretionary policy
choices of administrative agencies could not plausibly be expected to
produce this outcome. Third, it explains that although the political control
model suggests that agencies should be able to justify their policy decisions
with a wide array of political reasons, the implementation of this theory
would have normatively unattractive consequences that even the strongest
proponents of an enhanced role for political reasons in administrative law
have sensibly resisted. This Part concludes by criticizing the recent proposals
to give agencies credit for relying on political reasons for their policy
decisions on a number of grounds.
A. MAJORrrY RULE Is NOT THE TRUE END OF DEMOCRACY
The argument in favor of majority rule is straightforward and
superficially compelling. When society makes a collective decision, the
citizens who will be legally bound by that decision (or their politically
accountable representatives) should have the opportunity to vote, and the
side with the most votes should win.49 This decision-making process has the
virtue of treating everyone equally in the sense that each vote carries the
same weight and therefore no one's preferences count for more than
anyone else's.so Majority rule is also thought to increase free will, preference
satisfaction, and the extent to which citizens can be said to consent to
governmental authority because, by definition, more people are getting what
they want than would be the case under any other decision-making
procedure.5l Finally, since a modern government makes so many decisions
49. See Stephen Macedo, Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design,
go B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2010) ("Majoritarianism can be supported on a variety of grounds,
but the simplest and apparently most morally basic defense is that when 'equal' persons
disagree about what the rules or policies should be, the fairest way of settling the disagreement
is to give everyone an equal vote and the side that gets the most votes wins.").
50. See Rebecca L. Brown, The Logic of Majority Rule, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 23, 34 (2006)
("Equality lies in some form at the heart of each defense of majority rule."); Amy Gutmann,
How Not To Resolve Moral Conflicts in Politics, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 3 (1999) ("The
great virtue of majoritarianism is that its voting procedures express the idea that all adults are
free and equal citizens.").
51. See Brown, supra note 50, at 31-32 (describing the classic liberal argument and
utilitarian or rational actor justifications for majority rule).
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on such a wide variety of issues, each citizen will be a member of both
majorities and minorities.52 Majority rule is therefore thought to be the most
democratic procedure for making collective decisions in a pluralistic society
that is characterized by persistent political disagreement. This idea has
particularly caught on in a post-realist, post-Bickel, post-ig6os world, where
it is widely believed that there are no single, objectively correct answers to
most controversial moral or political questions.53 If we cannot agree on the
answers, we can at least agree to abide by the results of a majority vote.
Despite its superficial appeal, majority rule has a number of widely
recognized problems from the standpoint of democracy. First, as a purely
procedural theory, it places no substantive limits on the permissible contents
of the majority's decisions.>s Second, the majority is under no obligation to
consider the interests or perspectives of minorities in making its decisions
under this procedure.55 Majority rule therefore suggests that numerical
might makes right, but it is notoriously difficult to explain how the minority
could plausibly be understood to have consented to the coercive decisions of
52. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Note, The Emptiness of Majority Rule, s MICH.J. RACE & L.
195, 237 (1996) (recognizing that "one of the standard justifications for simple majority rule
... is the notion that an individual might be in the minority today, tomorrow, and perhaps the
next day as well," but "chances are that the individual will find himself or herself in the majority
more often than in the minority" in the long run); Lani Guinier, Keynote Address by Lani Guinier,
25 U. TOL. L. REV. 875, 879 (1994) (explaining that the conventional case for majority rule is
based on "a rule of shifting majorities, as the losers at one time or on one issue join with others
and become part of the governing coalition at another time or on another issue").
53. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 64-
72 (1989) (describing these developments and their impact on constitutional theory); see also
Bressman, supra note 3, at 478-85 (discussing the impact of the majoritarian paradigm in
constitutional theory on administrative law theory and doctrine).
54. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 27-33 (criticizing procedural
theories of democracy and claiming that "[a] majority vote alone cannot legitimate an outcome
when the basic liberties or opportunities of an individual are at stake"); GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 96 (endorsing "the standard objection" that "mere procedures,
such as majority rule, cannot justify outcomes that are unjust according to substantive
principles"). Of course, most majoritarian theories of democracy recognize some fundamental
constitutional rights in an effort to limit the scope of this problem. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
supra note 38, at 31. It is also widely accepted that administrative agencies cannot exceed the
scope of their statutory authority. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. Accordingly,
the law imposes some constraints on the extent to which agencies can implement majoritarian
preferences. Because these constraints are relatively minimal and agencies routinely exercise
substantial policymaking discretion, there remains a need to legitimize the exercise of
administrative authority in a democracy. Reliance on the will of the majority to control such
broad exercises of agency discretion would not prevent the threat of arbitrary governmental
action. As a result, and for the reasons explained above, a deliberative model of administrative
legitimacy is superior to the presidential control model as a means of legitimizing the wide
array of specific policy choices that are made on a daily basis by administrative agencies in the
modern regulatory state.
55. See Gutmann, supra note 5o, at 5 (criticizing procedural theories of democracy on the
grounds that they "are silent about . . . the evidence, arguments, and claims that [must be]
considered before a vote is taken," and therefore neglect the importance of deliberation).
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the majority under these conditions56 Third, this problem is exacerbated by
the fact that there may be groups within a society that systematically lose on
the issues of greatest importance to them.57 Finally, although majority voting
can reliably measure preferences when there are only two options, nearly
every important issue of public policy could be resolved in a wide variety of
ways.58 Social choice theory has demonstrated that "[i]n some
circumstances, majority rule may not resolve the choice among three or
more mutually exclusive alternatives that are voted on in pairs."59
Accordingly, the final outcome of majority voting in lawmaking bodies is
frequently the result of the way in which the decision-making process is
structured, rather than the true policy preferences of a majority of voters.so
For an example that illustrates some of the problems with majority rule,
imagine a scenario in which a group of five strangers is riding together in a
cabin on a passenger train.6' Three of the passengers smoke cigarettes, and
the question arises whether they should be allowed to engage in their habit
while the other passengers are in the car. Under a system in which the
majority rules, there is a good chance that smoking will be allowed in the
cabin because the smokers outnumber the nonsmokers three-to-two. This
may or may not be a defensible solution, but imagine further that one of the
two nonsmokers has a severe case of asthma, and that being exposed to
secondhand smoke in such close quarters will likely cause her to become
seriously ill and perhaps even die. Imagine further that the second
nonsmoker noticed on an earlier trip to the restroom that there is a
designated "smoking" cabin just down the hall from where the five
passengers are located. In a purely majoritarian system, where voting is
conducted without deliberation and where citizens are expected to express
their pre-political preferences, the majority may still vote to allow smoking in
56. See Amy Gutmann, Deliberative Democracy and Majority Rule: Reply to Waldron, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 227, 232 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye
eds., 1999) (claiming that majority rule can constitute "a numerical version of might makes
right"; and that "[aill individuals, regardless of whether they are willing or able to deliberate,
are deemed equally powerful, and 50 percent plus one of a group are deemed sufficiently
powerful to move the entire body whatever way they please").
57. See id. ("Majority rule loses its moral appeal when there are discrete and insular
minorities whose equally meritorious political views are consistently less likely to prevail than
those of a relatively cohesive majority.").
58. Cf Macedo, supra note 49, at 1039 (acknowledging that majoritarianism "has the
virtue of simplicity, and it is decisive when there are two options"; but claiming that
"majoritarianism as an ideology is a simplistic and morally unattractive solution to the problem of
collective self-rule amidst the great diversity and disagreement of modern mass societies").
59. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 98-
102 (2000) (describing and providing an example of "Arrow's Paradox").
6o. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGEJR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 72-74 (4 th ed. 2007).
61. This is a modified version of an example that was previously used by Amy Gutmann.
For her discussion, see Gutmann, supra note 50, at 3-4.
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the cabin. I would contend, however, that this decision would be
procedurally and substantively illegitimate. If, however, the parties engaged
in reasoned deliberation on which course of action would promote the
public good, they would almost certainly adopt a different and better
alternative, which might even be memorialized by a vote at the end of the
discussion.6 . Unlike the previous choice, moreover, this decision could fairly
be described as a collective one, and it would be procedurally and
substantively valid. The latter choice would therefore be more democratic, even
though it is not what a majority of the participants would initially have
wanted.
Stephen Macedo has recently argued that "we should stop talking about
'majoritarianism' as a plausible characterization of a political system that we
would recommend," and that "legitimate democracies are those that respect
minority rights and promote fair and inclusive deliberation."63
"Majoritarianism" is also not a remotely plausible characterization of the
political system we have. In this regard, the Framers of the Constitution were
particularly concerned with the potential for "faction" within the populace
and the resulting "tyranny of the majority."64 They rejected direct democracy
at the federal level in favor of a republican democracy, "which was intended
to ensure that lawmaking was the product of thoughtful deliberation by
elected representatives, rather than the passions or narrow self-interests of
the people."65 The Framers, of course, also devised a system of separated
powers and checks and balances, including bicameralism and
presentment,66 which imposes a super-majority requirement on the
enactment of legislation, and thereby facilitates reasoned deliberation in an
effort to achieve broad consensus on ways of promoting the public good that
take the views of political minorities into account.67 Cass Sunstein has
characterized the picture of American democracy that emerges from this
constitutional structure as a "deliberative democracy," rather than a system
that merely aggregates the pre-political preferences of citizens or elected
representatives. 68
The Constitution did not explicitly reserve a place for policymaking by
unelected administrators who are authorized by statute to promulgate
62. I would assume that this decision would be unanimous, but as Stephen Macedo has
recently pointed out, "Somewhere there will be a crank, zealot, or nut who disagrees with the
most sensible and well-justified of policies." Macedo, supra note 49, at 1035.
63. Id. at 1o3o.
64. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
65. Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to
Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-03 (2003).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
67. See Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 10oo, 1018-22 (2006).
68. Sunstein, supra note 36, at 45 (quoting Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The
Majority Principle in Republican Government, in How Democratic is the Constitution? 102 (Robert
A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980)).
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legally binding rules without complying with the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment.69 Public officials and scholars have therefore
devoted tremendous effort to developing theories of legitimacy for the
modern regulatory state, where such administrative policymaking is
pervasive.7o Legal scholars have also studied the intellectual history of these
efforts and documented how the prevailing theories of the legitimacy of the
modern regulatory state have shifted over time.7' Lisa Bressman has
persuasively claimed that the interest group representation model that
prevailed during the late ig6os and 1970s provided the first theory of
legitimacy for the administrative state that focused primarily on the extent to
which agency decision making reflected popular preferences, rather than
focusing on the extent to which structural safeguards existed to prevent
arbitrary decision making.72 When the interest-group-representation model
was replaced by the presidential control model during the ig8os, the
emphasis on popular control of agency decision making was retained, but
the mechanism for achieving popular control shifted "from interest groups
to the one governmental actor responsive to the entire nation."73 The
presidential control model is characterized, in its strongest form, by the
importance that it attaches to giving the President (or allowing the President
to assert) directorial control, as opposed to merely supervisory or managerial
control, over the modern administrative state.74 Not only does presidential
control provide the prevailing model of legitimacy in administrative law at
this time, but Bressman has quite plausibly predicted that "[t] he President's
69. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION Io (2010) ("The biggest change in the Constitutional structure [over
time] has been the creation of the modern administrative state . . . .").
70. See Farina, supra note 3, at 987 ("Like an intriguing but awkward family heirloom, the
legitimacy problem is handed down from generation to generation of administrative law
scholars.").
71. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 3, at 469-91; Kagan, supra note 7, at 2272-83; David S.
Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2169, 2186-2213 (2010); Stewart, supra note io, at 1671-88.
72. Bressman, supra note 3, at 475-78.
73. Id. at 486.
74. See id. at 485 ("President Reagan and his successors, both Republican and Democrat,
have asserted not only managerial but directorial control of the administrative state."). The
validity of the strongest form of the presidential control model is subject to ongoing debate.
Compare Kagan, supra note 7, at 2251 ("IA] statutory delegation to an executive agency official
... usually should be read as allowing the President to assert directive authority ... over the
exercise of the delegated discretion."), with Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or "the Decider"?:
The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 7o4-05 (2007) ("[I]n ordinary
administrative law contexts, where Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject
to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President's role-like that of the
Congress and the courts-is that of overseer and not decider."). Although the resolution of this
debate is beyond the scope of this Article, my arguments have a tendency to undermine the
former view and suggest certain conditions or limitations on the latter position.
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unique capacity for public responsiveness-in a word, majoritarianism-
ensures that this model is likely to survive into the future."75
The problem, of course, is that while the presidential control model of
administrative law may be straightforward and superficially compelling, it
does not reflect a sound understanding of the American constitutional
structure or the meaning of democracy. Even if the presidential control
model worked as predicted, an agency's decision to follow the preferences
of a President who is adhering to the will of a majority of the people would
not be constitutionally or democratically legitimate. The reason is that this
model fully incorporates the most fundamental problems with the
democratic legitimacy of majority rule.76 First, as a procedural theory, it
places no substantive limits on the permissible contents of an agency's
decisions.77 Second, the presidential control model does not impose any
obligation on decision makers to consider the interests and perspectives of
minorities. On the contrary, because presidential elections are expected to
serve as the mechanism for ensuring that agencies make policy decisions
that comport with the will of the people, the interests and perspectives of
anyone who lacks political clout can safely be ignored, even if those
individuals or groups will be most directly affected by a decision. Third, this
problem is exacerbated by the fact that there may be groups within society
that systematically lose on the issues of greatest importance to them. The
presidential control model therefore suggests that electoral might makes
right, but it cannot explain how the minority could plausibly be understood
to have consented to the adverse decisions of the majority under these
conditions. As such, agency policy decisions would not represent truly
collective decisions that the minority, as well as the majority, would have
public-regarding reasons to accept.
It would also be ironic if the constitutionally suspect nature of
administrative policymaking could be overcome by its allegedly majoritarian
nature when the Framers of the Constitution were at such pains to establish
a government that would avoid the potential for faction within the populace
and the resulting tyranny of the majority.78 If the goals of representation,
bicameralism, and presentment were to ensure that lawmaking was the
product of thoughtful deliberation by elected representatives rather than
the passions or narrow self-interests of the people, the replacement of those
structural safeguards with a purely majoritarian model of administrative law
is not even remotely responsive to the problem. While the President could
theoretically engage in reasoned deliberation about which courses of action
75. Bressman, supra note 3, at 491.
76. Cf supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
77. As explained above, some agency action could potentially be invalidated on statutory
or constitutional grounds, but that does not obviate the need to legitimize other discretionary
exercises of administrative authority. See supra note 54.
78. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
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would best promote the public good that took the views of political
minorities into account, so could a benevolent dictator (or an administrative
agency). The key point, however, is that the presidential control model does
not contemplate this role for the President, and even if it did, we would
need to adopt other structural safeguards (besides elections) to ensure that
those responsibilities were upheld. At the end of the day, the presidential
control model cannot legitimize administrative policymaking because a
presidential directive to an agency to implement the preferences of a
majority of voters is not, standing alone, democratically or constitutionally
legitimate.
B. PoLmcAL CONTROL OFAGENCYACTIONDOES NOT RESULTIN MAjORiTY RuLE
The previous Subpart claimed that the presidential control model could
not legitimize agency policy decisions even if the model worked as
anticipated because governmental decisions in a constitutional democracy
are not supposed to reflect the unfiltered preferences of the majority. This
Subpart points out that there is little reason to think that the presidential
control model works as anticipated. The model assumes that the President's
decisions will typically reflect the preferences of a majority of the electorate,
and if the President strays from the will of the people, he or his political
party will be held politically accountable.79 Neither assumption is warranted.
First, the President is rarely held politically accountable for the specific
policy decisions of agencies. Second, an unregulated political process would
not prevent the President from favoring powerful special interests over the
potentially contrary preferences of the disorganized general public. As a
result, it is deeply problematic to assume that the presidential control model
reliably promotes majoritarianism. The White House's influence on agency
decision making is more likely to capture the strength of competing interest
group pressures, but existing inequalities render an unregulated pluralistic
conception of the administrative process normatively unattractive.
I have previously argued that contrary to the conventional wisdom,
"elected representatives are not politically accountable to the voters for their
specific policy decisions."so This form of political accountability would
require the electorate (1) to know about the government's decisions, (2) to
have established preferences about their desirability, (3) to be capable of
identifying who was responsible for particular policy choices, and (4) to vote
79. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
8o. Staszewski, supra note 39, at 1265-77. For other recent works that challenge the
viability of this notion of political accountability, see Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration:
Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEx. L. REV. 441 (2010); Edward
Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073
(2005); Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, and the Democratic Legitimacy
of Legislatures, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 45 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
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on the basis of this information at the next election. Yet the political science
literature on voter knowledge and decision making calls into question
whether any of these conditions are regularly met. On the contrary, the
White House makes countless decisions that are invisible to the electorate,
and even the relatively small number of decisions that receive some public
attention are not necessarily salient to a majority of voters.', The electorate
does not have preexisting or fixed preferences on many of the issues that are
brought to its attention, and public opinion can potentially be "crafted" by
public officials and other elites for their own purposes.8' Not only is it
difficult to ascertain who is responsible for policy decisions in a federal
system of government with separated powers and a variety of checks and
balances, but White House officials undoubtedly play a major role in many
governmental decisions that are never attributed to the President.83 Even if a
first-term President made numerous unpopular decisions that were
transparent, American voters would still only be presented with one
reasonably viable alternative.4 Finally, the President is not eligible for
reelection after his second term, and he makes far too many decisions for
electoral sanctions realistically to come into play on any regular basis.8s
81. For examples of works recognizing the low level of voter knowledge, see John A.
Ferejohn, Information and the Electoral Process, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 3, 3
(John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 199o) ("Decades of behavioral research have
shown that most people know little about their elected officeholders, less about their
opponents, and virtually nothing about the public issues that occupy officials from Washington
to city hall."); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective
on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304 (2004) ("The most
important point established in some five decades of political knowledge research is that the
majority of American citizens lack even basic political knowledge.").
82. See Schacter, supra note 8o, at 59-63.
83. See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of
Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 207 (1995); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 82 (2006) (conducting an empirical study of White
House influence on the EPA and reporting that "White House involvement seldom was
transparent to the public," and "the president (and most notably, President Clinton)
demonstrated little official involvement in EPA rule-makings"); Mendelson, supra note 5, at
1146-59 (reviewing available information, and reporting that "it seems clear that public
documents describing OMB views on agency decisions in the George W. Bush Administration
significantly understate the impact of OMB review").
84. See NELSON W. PoLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: CONTEMPORARY
STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL POLITICS 292 (7 th ed. 1988) ("It is possible for candidates
to get loo percent of the votes and still have every voter opposed to most of their policies, as
well as having every one of their policies opposed by most of the voters."); Farina, supra note 3,
at 998 (describing the acute "bundling problem" faced by voters in presidential elections, which
"precludes any facile translation of election results into 'the people's will' on specific policy
issues").
85. SeeShane, supra note 83, at 199-200 ("[D]uring both an initial campaign and another
for reelection, a presidential candidate knows that his detailed stances on matters of policy are
not likely to make decisive differences in his political fortunes. . . . [F]ollowing a successful
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Similarly, "the vast majority of regulatory decision making flies beneath
the general public's radar and implicates established preferences of the
electorate only at very high levels of abstraction."86 Not only are most voters
unlikely to know or care about most administrative decisions, but they will
routinely have difficulty accurately gauging responsibility for those decisions
that subsequently prove unpopular. While some of the highest profile
agency decisions might occasionally be attributed to the President, all of the
limitations on his political accountability would exist in this context as well.
In short, the idea that voters will hold the President accountable in an
election for discretionary agency decisions is wildly unrealistic, except in very
unusual circumstances.87 The "chain of accountability" that is envisioned by
political control models of administrative legitimacy is therefore broken,
and policy decisions by administrative agencies cannot really be attributed to
the will of the people in this fashion.88
Advocates of the political control model of administrative law must still
believe that the political influence of the President or Congress "will make
administrative agencies more responsive to the current will of the people."8 9
This could occur if elected officials had a clear mandate from the voters and
acted consistent with their expectations, but it seems unlikely in an era that
is characterized by a closely divided electorate with limited knowledge of, or
opinions about, the detailed policy questions that confront agencies.9o It
could also occur, however, if elected representatives vigorously pursued the
apparent preferences of their constituents who stood to be affected by
particular administrative decisions. In other words, agencies may be
accountable to the voters because elected representatives exert political
pressure on agencies to adopt policies that further the pre-political interests
of their constituents.
The problem, however, is that this understanding of the political
control model ignores the basic lessons of public choice theory. As I have
previously pointed out in a related context:
If narrow private interests have organizational advantages that
allow them to extract "rents" from the general public in exchange
reelection campaign, there is no further prospect of confronting the electorate to discipline a
President's policy judgments.").
86. Staszewski, supra note 39, at 1271 & n.68.
87. Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 143, 176;
see also Criddle, supra note 8o, at 456-65 (evaluating the premises of theories of presidential
administration, and concluding that "the case for viewing the American presidency as a reliable
proxy for the will of the people collapses all too quickly once its assumptions are exposed to
close scrutiny").
88. Staszewski, supra note 39, at 1271 n.68.
8g. Staszewski, supra note 87, at 176 (discussing and critiquing this possibility).
go. See Criddle, supra note 8o, at 458 ("Political scientists have long recognized that
presidential elections can rarely, if ever, be construed as conferring genuine mandates for
presidents to pursue particular regulatory policies.").
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for providing support to self-interested public officials, the
implementation of a theory that relies upon elected representatives
to exert political pressure on agencies to further the interests of
their "constituents" is a recipe for disaster (or, at least, regulatory
capture) .9
From this perspective, the presidential control model's assumption that
political influence on administrative agencies will reliably promote
majoritarianism appears completely unwarranted. Rather, in the absence of
a more meaningful electoral check (or other structural safeguards), there is
nothing to prevent the President from favoring powerful special interests
over the potentially contrary preferences of the disorganized general public.
Public choice theory tells us that the diffuse public interests that are typically
promoted by modern social welfare legislation will systematically be
disadvantaged by an unregulated administrative process.92
Contrary to the underlying assumptions of the presidential control
model, there is little reason to think that the President's influence over
administrative agencies will regularly lead them to make decisions that
comport with the preferences of a majority of citizens, or that the electorate
will hold the President politically accountable for agency decisions that
deviate from this standard. It is just as likely to think that the President will
encourage agencies to cater to narrow special interests and the vast majority
of the general public will not know or care, and that the attentive public who
does learn about such decisions will not have sufficient political influence to
do very much about it.
An unapologetic advocate of the presidential control model might
contend that there is nothing that the law can or should do about this state
of affairs. As long as agencies follow the directives of the President and the
President must stand for periodic elections, we should rely upon a free
political market to correct any unpopular or allegedly unacceptable agency
policy decisions. If the general public is unaware of, or unconcerned about,
what agencies are doing, then attentive members of the public who are
91. Staszewski, supra note 87, at 177; see McNollgast, supra note 33, at 1714 ("If elected
officials are a willing co-conspirator in agency capture, evidence that they influence policy will
not assuage fears that the public interest is subverted.").
92. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34-41 (1998) (describing the central aspects of public choice theory); id.
at 39-40 (explaining that from the perspective of public choice theory, "[i]nterest groups with
the most at stake in a particular regulatory decision, who spend the most to buy that decision,
typically see their demand for regulation met by legislators who acquiesce in order to enjoy
continued electoral success and the benefits that holding office brings"); Cass R. Sunstein,
What's Standing After Lujan ?: Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MiCH. L. REV. 163, 219
(1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia's restrictive view of standing, and pointing out that "[s]ome
minorities are especially well-organized and do indeed have access to the political process,
including the executive branch," while "some majorities are so diffuse and ill-organized that
they face systematic transaction costs barriers to the exercise of ongoing political influence").
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critical of agency decision making should do a better job of mobilizing the
citizenry. If, however, the political opposition is unsuccessful in those efforts,
then the President should continue to encourage agencies to give the
interest groups that exert the most political pressure on behalf of their
preferred outcomes precisely what they want. From this perspective, such a
decision would embody "the will of the people."
There are at least three overwhelming problems with this response to a
critique of the operative assumptions of the presidential control model.
First, because the President is not politically accountable for the specific
policy decisions of administrative agencies, the electoral check on agency
decision making that is demanded by the model is essentially an empty
formality. Second, there are undeniable market failures in the political
process that make it extremely difficult for the broad, disorganized general
public (i.e., the majority) and certain discrete and insular or otherwise
unpopular minorities to exert sufficient political pressure on the executive
branch adequately to protect their interests.9s Those market failures would
need to be addressed and resolved before a pluralistic conception of the
administrative process could even fairly (if not legitimately) operate. Finally,
and perhaps most important, the advocates of the presidential control
model have not promoted their theory on the grounds that it provides the
best mechanism for ensuring that administrative agencies satisfy the
preferences of powerful special interests. Rather, the presidential control
model has been portrayed as the best mechanism for ensuring that
administrative agencies make policy decisions that comport with the
preferences of a majority of the people.94 The theory has therefore
capitalized on the widespread perception that the majority should rule in a
democracy. If the proponents of the presidential control model were
93. See Criddle, supra note 8o, at 464 ("[T]he available evidence suggests that presidential
administration does not reliably reduce the threat of countermajoritarian agency rulemaking
and may, in fact, greatly exacerbate the problem."); see, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra
note 83, at 87-88 ("[Alccording to EPA respondents [to survey questions], business groups
exerted somewhat more influence on White House involvement in EPA rule-making than
environmental groups did.... [T]he outputs [of White House interventions] favored narrow
interests . . . [because] the White House readily sought changes that would reduce burdens on
regulated entities, and veered from those that would increase such burdens . .. [, and] the
White House did not hesitate to seek changes that reduced protections for human health and
the environment, and routinely eschewed changes with a positive effect."); Steven Croley, White
House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 858 fig.6
(2003) (reporting greater attendance at OIRA meetings by persons representing narrow
interests than by persons representing broad-based interests); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking
in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA's Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 123-
51 (2011) (finding substantial imbalances in representation and influence between industry
and environmental groups regarding the EPA's hazardous-air-pollutant rules at several stages of
the administrative process).
94. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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actually required to defend an unadulterated version of interest group
theory, their model would lose most of its apparent normative appeal.
C. POLITICAL REASONS AND POLITICAL-CONTROL THEORY
As explained above, prominent scholars have relied upon the political
control model to argue that courts should give agencies credit for justifying
their policy decisions with political reasons under the arbitrary and
capricious standard of judicial review.95 Yet, the advocates of an increased
role for political reasons in administrative law uniformly impose a couple of
important conditions or limitations on their proposals. First, they claim that
agencies should only receive credit for following the President's preferences
or otherwise relying on political reasons when the White House's influence
is openly and transparently disclosed.96 This condition is consistent with the
presidential control theory because it increases the likelihood that voters
could hold the President politically accountable for an agency's policy
choices.97 Professor Mendelson has persuasively explained that the current
lack of adequate transparency regarding the White House's influence on
agency rulemaking "makes it less likely that the electorate will perceive that
there is meaningful presidential supervision of agency decision making,
making the agency actions less legitimate," and "also reduces the chance of
the electorate understanding the content of that presidential supervision,
further reducing the accountability of the President for those decisions." 5
Second, the advocates of an increased role for political reasons in
administrative law have endorsed important substantive limits on what
potentially counts as a legitimate political influence on agency decision
making. In particular, Professor Watts distinguishes between "legitimate
political influences . . . that seek to further policy considerations or public
values," and "illegitimate political influences ... that seek to implement raw
95. See supra notes 5, 47 and accompanying text.
96. See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1 13o, 1163-66 ("We should require that a significant
agency rule include at least a summary of the substance of executive supervision."); Watts, supra
note 2, at 44 ("[C]ourts would have to be clear that political influences can help to justify
agency decisions only when agencies openly and transparently disclose such influences in their
rulemaking records."); see also Kagan, supra note 7, at 2382 ("[I]f presidential policy is to count
as an affirmative reason to sustain administrative action, . . . then the relevant actors should
have to disclose publicly and in advance the contribution of this policy to the action . . . .").
97. See Watts, supra note 2, at 44-55 (emphasizing that this condition is one key to
achieving the alleged monitoring and accountability benefits of her proposal). For reasons
explained above, however, I continue to have my doubts about the strength of this political
accountability. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text; see also Mendelson, supra note 5,
at i16o ("Even if presidential supervision of agency decisions is well known to the voting
population, holding a President accountable for particular agency decisions is hard enough,
given the infrequency of elections, the number of issues typically on the agenda at the time of a
presidential election, presidencies that only last two terms, and presidential candidates who are
vague about how the administrative state would run.").
98. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1159.
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politics or partisan politics unconnected in any way to the statutory scheme
being implemented."99 She therefore claims, for example, that agencies
should not receive credit for justifying their policy decisions by purporting
to rely on presidential directives to reward important campaign
contributors,oo or when presidential directives are unadorned by further
policy explanations. o Professor Watts also claims:
[P]residential prodding should not be allowed to help explain
agency action where the President directs an agency to act in a way
that would flout congressional will as set forth in the statute being
implemented, or where the President asks the agency to act in a
way that would conflict with the existing evidence.o0
Similarly, Professor Mendelson contends that "[c] ertain types of presidential
pressure seem clearly out of bounds," including "presidential influence that
is inconsistent with the agency's legal constraints" or "that prompts the
agency to ignore its factual or technical conclusions," as well as "influence
that is aimed at achieving some goal other than service to the public
interest."103
While these proposed limitations on the contents of legitimate political
reasons seem sensible enough, they are decidedly not the product of the
presidential control model of administrative law. Rather, if the presidential
control model were taken to its logical conclusion, any constitutionally
permissible policy decision by an administrative agency that is consistent
with its governing statute and supported by the President should be upheld
by the judiciary.I04 There is certainly no warrant for concluding that "raw
politics" or "partisan politics" are illegitimate under a model of regulatory
legitimacy that relies on the prospect of political accountability to ensure
that elected officials influence agencies to make decisions that comport with
99. Watts, supra note 2, at 9; see also id. at 53-57 (discussing "types of political factors that
might appropriately be relied upon" by agencies and courts).
soo. Id. at 5 4 - 5 5 .
olo. Id. at 55 ("Allowing an agency to base a decision on such a bald presidential
direction-unbounded by the relevant statutory scheme, facts, or evidence-would leave the
President with unfettered discretion to direct the outcome of an agency's decision in a way
unconnected to any articulation of public values or the public interest.").
102. Id. at 6o (footnote omitted).
103. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1 141; see also id. at 1171-77 (discussing the appropriate
scope of judicial review of agency decisions that are influenced by political reasons, and
providing some preliminary thoughts on the types of political reasons that are legitimate).
104. Mendelson and Watts correctly emphasize that administrative agencies must comply
with statutory limits on their authority. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. It
therefore follows that agencies cannot legitimately violate their statutory authority based on a
directive from the President. It bears noting, however, that some advocates of the presidential
control model have endorsed administrative law doctrines that expand executive power in ways
that potentially allow agencies to deviate from Congress's intent in a variety of circumstances.
SeeStaszewski, supra note 87, at 154-55.
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majoritarian preferences or the results of interest group pressure. The
presidential control model is premised on a theory of democracy that
questions the very existence of a "public interest" that is independent of
these considerations. os It is therefore difficult to see why the presidential
control model would frown upon agency decisions that are justified by
compliance with presidential directives to make certain policy choices
because, for example, (1) the decision would help the President's reelection
chances, (2) the decision would benefit an important supporter (and
campaign donor) of the President, or (3) "the President said so." A
President's efforts to improve his reelection chances are presumably
correlated with his ability to make decisions that are favored by a majority of
voters. Accordingly, decisions that are made on this basis are presumably
most likely to reflect the will of the people, and they would therefore be
completely legitimate from the perspective of the political-control theory.
Similarly, if voters dislike policies that are adopted to satisfy the naked
preferences of the President or his campaign donors, they should either
outspend their political rivals or vote for another candidate who will adopt a
different point of view. A well-functioning pluralist democracy should
naturally result in policies that are favored by elected officials, a majority of
citizens, or the constituents with the most intense preferences on a matter-
even if those decisions deviate from the factual or technical evidence in the
administrative record.,o6 As Justice Scalia has suggested, "[T]he retribution
or reward [for such decisions] will be meted out by Congress, or at the polls,
but not in the courts."o7
The limitations that Mendelson and Watts devise for legitimate political
reasons are therefore deviations from the presidential control model and the
product of more deliberative alternatives. Professor Watts acknowledges:
In thinking about how judges might approach this problem of line
drawing, it is helpful to look to work by Cass Sunstein and other
proponents of "civic republicanism" who have detailed as a
descriptive matter how judges seek to (and as a normative matter
how they ought to seek to) ensure that challenged governmental
105. Stewart, supra note to, at 1683 (claiming that in the post-New Deal era, "we have come
not only to question the agencies' ability to protect the 'public interest,' but to doubt the very
existence of an ascertainable 'national welfare' as a meaningful guide to administrative
decision"); see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
to6. See Pierce, supra note 21, at 121-24 (claiming that agencies should consider a host of
political factors in making any important decision); Antonin Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in
Deregulation, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 191, 197-98 (1986) (claiming that rulemaking is inherently
political; agencies do not give the entire explanation for their decisions; and "if you thought
that [the formula adopted by EPA in Sierra Club v. Costle] was scientifically arrived at and was not
the product of a political compromise between the high-sulphur states and the low-sulphur
states, you believe in Santa Claus").
107. Antonin Scalia, Chairman's Message, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. xxv, xxxi
(1982), quoted in Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1177.
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decisions implicating constitutional and administrative law issues
are supported by some kind of "public value" rather than by a mere
"naked preference" for one group over another.",os
She points out that "civic republicans assert that judges generally seek to
ensure that political actors reflect on the public good and make decisions
designed to advance the public interest and public values rather than merely
caving to interest group pressure."o9 Similarly, Professor Mendelson claims
that even though agencies should be allowed to rely more heavily on
transparent political reasons, "the agency's action still must be bounded,
roughly speaking, by the terms of the law under which the agency operates
and by a demand for reasoned, nonarbitrary decision making.",o Not only is
such a demand for reasoned, nonarbitrary decision making in the public
interest a trademark of deliberative democratic theories, but Mendelson
ultimately acknowledges her ambivalence toward the dominant political
control models. She concludes her article by suggesting that "it may be time
to revisit presidential supervision as a basis for the legitimacy of the
administrative state," and claiming that it could turn out that "we might
rather have our 'experts' make our value choices for us than our
politicians.""I
The fact that the leading proponents of an enhanced role for political
reasons in administrative law feel compelled to abandon the presidential
control model and impose limitations drawn largely from deliberative
democratic theory strongly suggests that there is something fundamentally
wrong with the presidential control model. Indeed, I have already identified
the dual nature of the problem: (1) majority rule is not the true end of
constitutional democracy, and (2) political control of agency action does
not reliably lead to majority rule. It is therefore not surprising that
thoughtful scholars, like Professors Mendelson and Watts, who advocate a
greater role for political reasons in administrative law would also seek to
temper the inherent pathologies of the presidential control model and try to
ensure that political reasons are only valued when they promote a plausible
conception of the public good and do not result in arbitrary decision
making.
Nonetheless, by developing reform proposals that simultaneously
embrace some political reasons based on the presidential control model
while also precluding other political reasons based on deliberative
democratic theory, these scholars have achieved results that are theoretically
1o8. Watts, supra note 2, at 53 (citing Seidenfeld, supra note 36, at 1511; Sunstein, supra
note 36, at 29; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1689 (1984)).
og. Id.
110. Mendelson, supranote 5, at I144.
iii. Id. at 1178.
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incoherent. Although pragmatic ideas that draw from the best of different
theoretical traditions are frequently desirable, political control models of
administrative law and more deliberative approaches are fundamentally
incompatible.,2 This criticism is therefore not solely about an abstract
desire for theoretical purity. One simply cannot evaluate the appropriate
role of political reasons in administrative law without a normative
conception of what administrative agencies should be doing."3 Both
Mendelson and Watts conclude that political reasons can be legitimate or
illegitimate, depending on their content. They rely upon the presidential
control model for their understanding of the potential value of political
reasons, which is based on the popular notion that policy choices should be
made by politically accountable officials. Meanwhile, they rely upon
deliberative theories of administrative legitimacy to describe the potential
dangers of an agency's reliance on political reasons. But, as explained above,
it is not clear why some important categories of political reasons that
Mendelson and Watts find illegitimate would be problematic under the
presidential control model. Nor is it clear why an agency's reliance on
political reasons would have any significant value from the perspective of
deliberative theories. The President and members of Congress can already
comment on proposed agency rules, and those comments must be
considered on the merits along with other information in the administrative
record.' '4 The fact that certain views came from the President or Congress is
not ordinarily important from the perspective of deliberative democratic
theory."s Thus, if one wants to justify giving agencies credit for relying on
political reasons from the perspective of deliberative democratic theory, one
needs to identify the circumstances in which specific types of political
1 12. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 13 (distinguishing between first-order
theories of democracy that "seek to resolve moral disagreement by demonstrating that
alternative theories and principles should be rejected," and second-order theories that "make
room for continuing moral conflict that first-order theories purport to eliminate"; and
explaining that "[d]eliberative democracy's leading rivals among second-order theories are
what are known as aggregative conceptions of democracy"). Thus, while deliberative theories
can and do incorporate majoritarianism, and majoritarian theories can and do incorporate
deliberation, these theoretical models have fundamentally different goals and operational
principles. Coherent theories of deliberative democracy and majoritarian democracy (or
political control) must therefore be consistent with their underlying goals and operational
principles.
113. As explained above, the presidential control model and deliberative democratic theory
provide fundamentally incompatible answers to this question. See supra notes 32-40 and
accompanying text.
114. SeeWatts, supra note 2, at 63 & n.279.
115. See Cohen, supra note 37, at 22 (claiming that political power can be justified "if and
only if [a decision] could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals");
Thompson, supra note 36, at 506 ("[D]eliberative democracy is based on a moral principle of
reciprocity, a form of mutual respect that requires treating citizens as equals (even if, or
especially if, they are not equal in power).").
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reasons would help to justify agency decision making based on the tenets of
this theory. Mendelson and Watts have not done this, and they have
therefore either failed to justify some of the most significant limitations that
they would impose on political reasons, or failed to explain why political
reasons should be considered valuable in the first place.
One might object that it is unfair to criticize Mendelson and Watts for
blending political control models of administrative law and deliberative
democratic theory, while simultaneously proposing a deliberative
democratic approach to political reasons that takes certain majoritarian
preferences into account.n 6 From this perspective, my proposal to
incorporate some political preferences into a deliberative model of
administrative decision making could be understood as the flip side or
mirror image of Mendelson's and Watts's proposals. While this observation
has some validity, our respective differences in emphasis are quite
important. Mendelson and Watts apparently view deliberative democracy (or
legal and technical considerations) as a constraint on majoritarianism,
whereas I suggest that certain majoritarian preferences may be considered
when reasoned deliberation fails to settle an issue. The crux of the
disagreement, then, is on the appropriate starting place or baseline for
agency decision making: (i) majoritarianism tempered by some reasoned
deliberation, or (2) reasoned deliberation supplemented by some
majoritarianism. In my view, a model of administrative law that requires
agencies to engage in reasoned deliberation, supplemented by some
majoritarian preferences, is far superior because this model is more
constitutionally and democratically legitimate and more empirically
plausible. Moreover, while Mendelson and Watts fail to explain why
majoritarian preferences should be tempered by reasoned deliberation from
the perspective of political-control theories, I suggest that deliberative
democratic theory coherently incorporates certain majoritarian preferences
in some circumstances. The key question, as always, under deliberative
democratic theory is whether the reasons for a policy decision could
reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with competing
perspectives. My claim is that free and equal citizens could reasonably agree
to abide by the ascertainable preferences of a majority of citizens or the
broader philosophy and priorities of a duly elected President if (1) reasoned
deliberation has occurred, (2) the agency has not identified a feasible
alternative that is superior, and (3) the policy chosen by the agency is
consistent with fundamental rights and liberties and nonarbitrary on the
merits. In this specific and narrow context, the arguments for majority rule
and the agency theory of political representation could reasonably be viewed
as persuasive.
116. See infra Part W.A.
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In any event, the recent proposals to give politics a place in agency
decision making suffer from a host of other related problems."7 First,
Mendelson and Watts claim that their proposals will lead to greater
transparency and candor regarding the role of political reasons in agency
decision making."8 Yet, Watts's proposal leaves it entirely up to an agency to
decide when it wants to disclose political influences on its decision making,
and therefore does not require the disclosure of political reasons."*9 This
approach is likely to result in the disclosure of political reasons that portray
the executive branch in a positive light (or that are difficult to verify or
contest),2o while simultaneously resulting in a continued refusal to disclose
the very types of unflattering political reasons that Watts would consider
illegitimate..2 Mendelson's proposal largely avoids this problem by
requiring agencies to summarize the contents of executive review positions
and explain how those positions influenced final agency decisions,122 but
this requirement would not necessarily result in the disclosure of the real
political reasons behind the White House's efforts to convince agencies to
adopt particular positions. The White House will continue to have incentives
to explain its preferences by reference to "legitimate" political
considerations, such as cost-benefit analysis or the President's philosophy or
priorities, rather than "illegitimate" efforts to benefit major campaign
117. For other recent critiques of Mendelson's and Watts's proposals, see Johnson, supra
note 24, at 004 (identifying obstacles to the effective implementation of the proposals; and
claiming that they could unintentionally "contribut[e] to further ossification of the rulemaking
process" and increase partisan decision making by courts, in addition to undermining the
stability of administrative decision making); Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for
Arbitrary and Capricious Review (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No.
565, 2011) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=961753 ("[T]hose who have addressed the role of politics have confounded the
question of the legitimacy of politics in rulemaking with that of the legitimacy of judicial
consideration of politics in reviewing rulemaking.... [T] he hard look doctrine is a mechanism
to ensure that agencies do not hide value judgments behind simple incantations that their
actions are justified by political influence. Therefore, although politics may be a legitimate
motivation for agency regulation, it should be irrelevant tojudicial review of that regulation.").
i18. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1163-64; Watts, supra note 2, at 42-45.
1 19. Watts, supra note 2, at 44 ("Agencies themselves would face the burden of sufficiently
indicating the reasons for their actions in regulatory documents.").
120. Cf infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties associated
with evaluating an agency's refusal to take action based on alleged resource constraints or
competing priorities).
121. Watts, supra note 2, at 76 ("Agencies, in other words, are given the best of both worlds:
they could choose to disclose political influences when it would help give them an additional
reason to claim deference, or they could choose to ignore political influences when such
influences might be viewed as improper."). Despite acknowledging this issue, Watts claims that
efforts to mandate the disclosure of political reasons "would likely face various hurdles-
including claims of executive privilege." Id at 76. Mendelson briefly explains why potential
claims of executive privilege would generally be unavailing. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1 170.
122. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1164.
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donors or the President's brother-in-law..23 Accordingly, both proposals
would benefit the executive branch (by increasing its perceived legitimacy
and the chances of having its decisions upheld by a court) without
necessarily providing accurate information about the basis for the White
House's influence or its true motivations.
Second, any effort to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
political reasons will necessarily create significant line-drawing problems and
slippery-slope concerns.12 4 These problems are exacerbated by any
unresolved theoretical tensions between the alleged value of political
reasons and the perceived limitations on their legitimacy. For example, in
discussing potential objections to her proposal, Professor Watts points out
that a "major hurdle that might stand in the way of giving politics a place
involves what could be described as some judges' normative judgments that
the politicization of agency decisionmaking is dangerous."-5 While this
particular normative judgment is hardly limited to judges, Watts claims that
"judges are not likely to believe that political influences should completely
be kept out of agency decisionmaking." 6 Instead, she plausibly
characterizes the likely judicial attitude as follows:
[I]t seems far more likely that judges want to avoid seeing too much
politicization of agencies, not that they want to avoid seeing any
politicization at all. Thus, judges--even those judges who are
skeptical of political influences-might well be willing to modify
existing judicial doctrine to encourage agencies to openly disclose
political influences in appropriate circumstances. Doing so would
empower courts to ensure that political factors are used in an
appropriate fashion, not to covertly distort science or to suppress
politically inconvenient evidence .27
But if there is no general consensus-and no coherent guiding principles-
on when and why political reasons are legitimate and when and why they
should be limited, there are good reasons to worry that the resulting judicial
doctrine will be arbitrary or, even worse, that courts will simply open the
floodgates to the politicization of agencies. Professor Mendelson and
Professor Watts both seek to avoid this problem and provide more concrete
123. Id. at 1144 (providing the latter examples as the "type of executive influence [that]
obviously undermines the legitimacy of an agency decision, rather than enhancing it").
124. SeeJohnson, supra note 24, at 031 ("[T]he most difficult issues that would arise in
implementing Professor Watts' proposal . . . involve determining which political factors an
agency can consider, and how to weigh those political factors against other criteria that an
agency is required to consider by law.").
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legal guidance by resorting to "Congress's intent."128 The idea is that
because agencies are legally obligated to follow Congress's intent, they may
only consider logically relevant factors that were not precluded from
consideration by Congress in making their decisions.-9 Thus, one can
determine which political reasons may lawfully be considered by
ascertaining the types of political reasons that Congress would consider
"logically relevant" and presumably endorse. Because Congress does not
ordinarily answer these questions, however, any conclusions are necessarily
guesswork. Mendelson and Watts contend that their distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate political reasons are consistent with what
Congress would likely intend if it had considered and resolved these
matters.13o An equally compelling conclusion would be that because
Congress has not made any effort to alter the existing status quo whereby
political reasons are not given any credit under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, Congress apparently does not want agencies to be able to justify
their decisions with political reasons.'3' My sense is that because the
attribution of a controlling legislative intent in this area would necessarily be
a fiction, any effort to develop appropriate default rules would merely
reproduce the same underlying theoretical and empirical debates that pit
the presidential control model against deliberative democratic alternatives.
It is therefore highly doubtful that turning to Congress's intent can resolve
the relevant questions.
Third, even if there was general agreement on the types of political
reasons that could legitimately influence agency decision making, the
advocates of "giving politics a place" do not provide sufficient guidance on
precisely how agencies should weigh the competing considerations in making
specific policy decisions. Political considerations-including the President's
128. Mendelson, supra note 5, at I140-46, 1171-75 (noting that whether agencies can rely
on political reasons is "an interpretive question"; providing guidance on the appropriate
parameters of this practice and the accompanying scope ofjudicial review; and concluding that
"even if courts are deferential, they should at least be willing to inquire into the content of
political reasons considered by agencies to determine whether those reasons are consistent with
the agency's authorizing statute"); Watts, supra note 2, at 45-52 (recognizing that "the key [to
assessing the legality of an agency's reliance on political reasons] is to determine Congress's
intent"; advocating a presumption "that when Congress is silent on the matter, Congress
intended agencies to be able to consider all factors that are rationally and logically relevant to
the agency's decision, including certain political influences"; and acknowledging that "this ...
begs [the] question: where should the line be drawn between rational and logically relevant
political influences that we can presume Congress intended the agency to be able to consider
versus those sorts of corrupting political influences that Congress would not intend an agency
to consider?").
129. See Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1140-41; Watts, supra note 2, at 45; see also Pierce,
supra note 5, at 71-73.
130. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text; Watts, supra note 2, at 53-57
(explaining the types of political factors on which judges may rely).
131. See Watts, supra note 2, at 47 & n.206 (recognizing the plausibility of this position).
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philosophy, priorities, or campaign pledges, efforts to support particular
constituencies, the resource constraints on agencies, and the preferences of
a majority of voters-are frequently only broadly or tangentially related to
the substantive merits of the policy issues under consideration. These
political considerations will therefore not necessarily be responsive to, or
commensurate with, the evidence and arguments that are presented
regarding the best ways of implementing an agency's statutory authority on
the merits. Accordingly, there is a serious concern that the existing
proposals to give politics a place would, in practice, systematically allow
political considerations to trump an agency's considered judgment
regarding the best manner of implementing its statutory authority on the
merits. Professor Watts attempts to avoid this problem by emphasizing that
"political considerations alone should not be allowed to justify the
promulgation of a rule that conflicts with the existing evidence or with the
statute itself' because such an approach would "allow naked politics to
trump science and/or to trump the law."132 Professor Mendelson takes a
similar approach.-3S Meanwhile, they seem to agree that political reasons can
help justify agency decisions that are based at least in part on questions of
value in areas of scientific uncertainty.34 Most decisions by most agencies,
however, fall within these two categories.'ss Thus, the proposals to give
politics a place would allow political considerations to justify agency decision
making nearly all the time. But when agencies make decisions that involve
questions of value in areas of scientific uncertainty, it frequently is the case
that some decisions are demonstrably better than others on the merits.3 6
132. Id. at 73.
133. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1144 ("[T]he agency's action still must be bounded,
roughly speaking, by the terms of the law under which the agency operates and by a demand
for reasoned, nonarbitrary decision making."); id. at 1174 ("Even if a court were to treat value-
laden reasons from the executive branch highly deferentially, the legal- and expertise-laden
aspects of the decision should remain as susceptible to judicial review as before.").
134. Id. at 1142-46 ("A large space still remains in which potential presidential influence
should be seen as clearly appropriate. This space includes areas in which an agency must make
'policy judgments,' as well as, perhaps, decisions on some more technical or legal issues.");
Watts, supra note 2, at 58 ("[A] prime example of where presidential prodding should be
allowed to come into play is when agencies make value-based judgments in the face of scientific
uncertainty."); see also Kagan, supra note 7, at 2356-57 (claiming that a strong presidential role
is appropriate on issues that involve "political judgment").
135. See Kagan, supra note 7, at 2356-57 ("Agencies, for example, often must confront the
question, which science alone cannot answer, of how to make determinate judgments regarding
the protection of health and safety in the face both of scientific uncertainty and competing
public interests.").
136. Cf GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 17 ("Deliberative democracy certainly
does not accept as equally valid whatever reasons and principles citizens and public officials put
forward in defense of their own interests."); Gutmann, supra note 56, at 230-34 (pointing out
that disagreement is not reasonable on all political issues; and that even in the more limited
realm of genuinely reasonable disagreement, "there is good reason for democrats not to insist
on majority rule," when "a non-majoritarian decision-making rule is more likely to produce
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The existing proposals to give politics a place therefore create a serious
danger that agencies will routinely be allowed to rely on political
considerations to justify decisions that are not the most effective ways of
implementing their statutory authority. The proposals would thereby
undermine the underlying goals of the statutes enacted by Congress.37
Fourth, the existing proposals to give politics a place would further
shield agency inaction from meaningful judicial review.'13 Professor Watts
contends that her proposal could most readily be applied in the contexts of
denials of rulemaking petitions, withdrawals of proposed rules, and rule
rescissions.59 Not only are those decisions inherently deregulatory, but they
can nearly always be explained by reference to resource constraints or
competing priorities. It is notoriously difficult, however, for the judiciary to
justifiable decisions, or likely to produce more justifiable decisions, than the available
alternatives").
I37. Alternatively, it is possible that adopting such proposals would have little practical
impact. When elected officials provide compelling arguments and evidence on the
administrative record regarding the best course of action on the merits, there is nothing that
would prevent agencies from following this approach under the arbitrary and capricious
standard. It is true that an agency would be required to justify such a decision on the merits
rather than on the grounds that it was following the views of an elected official, but there is
nothing to prevent elected officials from persuading agencies to adopt their preferred courses
of action under the existing law. Moreover, to the extent that scholarly proposals to give politics
a place would only allow agencies to rely on political reasons when their decisions are consistent
with the agency's statutory authority and the evidence in the administrative record, it is difficult
to see what these political reasons would add since the agency's decisions should already be
upheld on the merits under the existing version of the arbitrary and capricious standard. In
other words, agencies do not need any "credit" for relying on political reasons in precisely those
circumstances when reliance on political reasons would seem most legitimate. It may be a good
thing for the electorate to have more information about whether elected officials agree with an
agency's policy choices, but the law does not prevent elected officials (or agencies) from
providing this information to voters as things stand.
138. It is already difficult to obtain judicial review of agency inaction because of potential
limitations on standing and the manner in which the APA has been interpreted by federal
courts. See Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 375-82 (2009)
(describing the relevant doctrine). For leading academic critiques of the judiciary's disparate
treatment of agency action and inaction, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency
Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1657, 1692 (2004) (claiming that.
nonreviewability and standing doctrines facilitate faction because "[t]hey make it more likely
that agencies will respond to private or political pressure rather than public welfare by giving
those typically harmed by agency action (i.e., regulated entities) more power to protest than
those typically harmed by agency inaction (i.e., regulatory beneficiaries)"); Cass R. Sunstein,
ReviewingAgency Inaction AfterHeckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 656 (1985) (criticizing
the Court's distinction between agency action and inaction; and emphasizing that "the
availability of [judicial] review will often serve as an important constraint on regulators during
the decisionmaking process long before review actually comes into play," and that "[r]eview at
the behest of statutory beneficiaries may perform a critical function in ensuring against unduly
lax enforcement that would violate statutory requirements").
139. Watts, supra note 2, at 65-72. Watts also suggests that her proposal could be invoked
when agencies promulgate final legislative rules, but she acknowledges that this is a "somewhat
messier" area. Id. at 72-73.
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assess whether these particular justifications are meritorious.14o And, while
there is obviously a legitimate need for each agency and Administration to
establish priorities, there are reasons to be wary of eliminating any
meaningful external review of those decisions. First, some Administrations
do not support the underlying goals of various statutory programs, and it
would be fairly easy for those Administrations to "prioritize" those programs
out of existence without ever defending the substantive merits of their
positions (or changing the laws on the books).'4' Second, when an agency
declines to take action on the basis of resource constraints or competing
priorities, it should be fair to assume that the agency and the Administration
have other priorities they are conscientiously pursuing. But a court that
defers to these justifications in an individual case has no reliable way of
assessing whether this is in fact the case, or whether those alternative plans
and priorities are reasonable.142 Giving agencies more credit for relying on
political reasons in these contexts would therefore seemingly provide the
White House and executive branch agencies with a "blank check" to decline
to take regulatory action. There is no reason to assume, however, that
agencies are immune from making arbitrary decisions in these contexts.'43
On the contrary, several scholars have pointed out that the absence of
meaningful judicial review of agency inaction creates incentives for agencies
to favor the views of regulated entities over the views of regulatory
beneficiaries during the administrative process regardless of the merits of a
policy dispute.'44 Accordingly, the existing proposals to give politics a place
in agency decision making could significantly increase the problem of
agency capture.
Finally, and to some extent most fundamentally, Professor Watts claims
that the existing version of the arbitrary and capricious standard is based on
140. See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 6o ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 26-27 (2008).
141. See Michael D. Sant'Anbrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform
judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1381, 1396
(201) (explaining that "[t]he President can delay the implementation of regulations contrary
to the administration's goals," and pointing out that "unchecked agency inaction caused by the
President constitutes an extralegislative veto on duly enacted statutes").
142. Recall, for example, that the George W. Bush Administration's EPAjustified its denial
of a petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles based, in part, on
the President's desire to develop a comprehensive plan to address the climate change issue.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007). Yet this "comprehensive plan" never came to
fruition during his tenure in office.
143. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 69 ("[T]he failure of the state to act
can subject citizens to as much coercion and violation of their rights as a decision to act.
Neither action nor inaction by the state should have a privileged status in moral justification.").
144. See supra note 138.
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the expertise model, an "outmoded model of agency decisionmaking,"145
and that agency decisions that are inherently political in nature are
therefore frequently justified based on "technocratic fagades."'46 Most
contemporary observers agree that agencies are delegated too much
discretionary authority for their decisions to be controlled solely by the
application of "neutral expertise,"47 but that does not mean that regulatory
decisions based on an agency's assessment of the substantive merits of an
issue are "technocratic faqades"--or that scientific or technical
considerations do not frequently favor one proposed solution over
another.'-4 Moreover, the existing version of hard-look review does not
preclude agencies from considering questions of "value."49 When agencies
are faced with questions of value in areas of scientific uncertainty, they could
resolve the underlying policy disputes by resorting to majority rule or the
results of interest group pressure. The primary alternative to political
control models of administrative law in contemporary democratic theory,
however, is not the "outmoded expertise model," but rather models of
145. Watts, supra note 2, at iS; id. at 33-35; cf id. at 14-32 (explaining that the current
version of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review focuses on expert agency decision
making, rather than politicized agency decision making).
146. Id. at 13; see id. at 42-45.
147. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note io, at 1683-84 ("Today, the exercise of agency discretion
is inevitably seen as the essentially legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of
various private interests affected by agency policy. . . . Once the function of agencies is
conceptualized as adjusting competing private interests in light of their configuration in a given
factual situation and the policies reflected in relevant statutes, it is not possible to legitimate
agency action by either the 'transmission belt' theory of the traditional model, or the 'expertise'
model of the New Deal period.").
148. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cudllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411, 463 (2005) (recognizing that regulatory problems often involve policy judgments, but
claiming that "[t]hose choices are almost certainly wiser when they are informed by the views of
technical experts and scientists, or by reasonable calculations of a regulation's likely costs and
benefits").
149. See id. at 467-68 (claiming that "legal decisions nearly always encompass policy and
value choices along with scientific ones"; and "[u]nless one defines technical expertise or
science in a way that explicitly includes political judgments, it is not plausible to treat all
regulatory policy issues as being primarily about expert or scientific decisionmaking"); Holly
Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act. Why Better Science Isn't Always Better
Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1081-82 (1997) (pointing out that the APA mandates
consideration of "the input of the general public"; even though this requirement "directly
contradicts the norms of science, which permit consideration only of informed opinions");
ThomasJ. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761,
761-62 (2oo8) ("The [hard-look] doctrine found its origins in judicial decisions requiring
administrative agencies to demonstrate that they had taken a 'hard look' at the underlying
questions of policy and fact. . . . Eventually courts went well beyond these procedural
requirements to take a hard look on their own, assessing the reasonableness of agency
judgments of policy and fact on their merits." (footnotes omitted)). But cf Nina A. Mendelson,
Foreword, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of EMail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1343, 1346
(201 1) (claiming that agencies appear to be discounting value-laden comments from the
general public during notice-and-comment rulemaking).
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regulatory governance that are based on principles of deliberative
democratic theory.150 Such theories are self-consciously designed to facilitate
legitimate policy decisions in the face of fundamental moral
disagreement.'5' Considering the problems associated with the presidential
control model and existing proposals to give politics a place in agency
decision making that are based on this theory, it is worthwhile to evaluate
the proper role of political reasons in administrative law from this
alternative theoretical perspective. That is the project to which this Article
now turns.
III. POLITICAL REASONS AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
This Part briefly describes the central tenets of deliberative democratic
theory, and explains why policy decisions made pursuant to the theory's
requirements will have greater legitimacy and a better chance of promoting
statutory goals than policy decisions that merely reflect political preferences.
It proceeds to explain that hard-look judicial review is best understood as a
structural safeguard that seeks to ensure that administrative agencies make
decisions that are compatible with deliberative democratic theory.
Nonetheless, this Part recognizes that political reasons are not necessarily
irrelevant under deliberative democratic theory and explains that
deliberative democratic theorists have not clearly articulated the appropriate
role for political reasons in administrative decision making. This Part
therefore identifies the underlying principles that should guide any effort to
incorporate political reasons into administrative decision making from the
perspective of deliberative democratic theory.
A. DELIBERA TIVE DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND HARD-LOOKJUDICIAL REVIEW
While majoritarian or pluralistic theories of democracy tend to
dominate modern public law, deliberative democracy has become "the 'most
active' area of political theory" in recent years.'52 The literature is
increasingly broad and diverse, but there are some fundamental ideas that
are central to deliberative democratic theory. First, political decisions should
reflect the preferences that emerge from a process of reasoned deliberation,
150. See Glen Staszewski, Response, The Challenges of Fiduciary Administration, 88 TEX. L. REv.
SEE ALsO 155, 16o-61 (2010) (contrasting the presidential control model with theories of
administrative legitimacy that emphasize the importance of reasoned deliberation).
151. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 1 (explaining that the core idea of
deliberative democracy is that "when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they
should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions"); Cohen, supra note
38, at 187-93 (describing his assumption of "the fact of reasonable pluralism: the fact that
there are distinct, incompatible philosophies of life to which reasonable people are drawn
under favorable conditions for the exercise of practical reason").
152. Thompson, supra note 36, at 498 (quoting John S. Dryzek, Theory, Evidence, and the
Tasks of Deliberation, in DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: CAN THE PEOPLE
GOVERN? 237, 237 (Shawn W. Rosenberg ed., 2007)).
2012] 885
HeinOnline  -- 97 Iowa L. Rev. 885 2011-2012
IOWA LAWREVIEW
rather than the pre-political preferences of a majority of citizens or the
strength of competing interest group pressures.'53 This means that the
participants in the lawmaking process should engage in a process of
deliberation and debate where they exchange information, ideas, and
arguments about the best course of action under the circumstances. It also
means that participants should be open-minded and willing to revise their
preexisting views and preferences based on new information and arguments,
and that any empirical claims that underlie their positions should be based
on the best available information and reliable methods of inquiry.'54
Because participants in a deliberative process have no reason to be
persuaded by the naked preferences ("this is what I want") or self-interested
arguments ("this is good for me") of others, public officials and citizens are
expected to provide reasoned explanations for their positions that could
reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with fundamentally
competing perspectives, and to explain how a proposed course of action
would promote the public good.'ss The deliberative process should
generally be transparent to the general public, and the justifications that
public officials offer for their decisions should be publicly accessible. 's6 Such
transparency is needed to provide citizens and other public officials with an
opportunity to discuss, evaluate, and criticize those decisions, "as well as
potentially to seek legal or political reform."'5 7 The results of the
deliberative process are therefore generally understood as provisional
because most legal and policy decisions can and should be changed if new
information and arguments (as well as experience under the existing
regime) suggest a better course of action on the merits.'58
For present purposes, the key distinctions between majoritarian or
pluralistic theories of democratic governance and more deliberative
alternatives is that while the former theories focus on making decisions that
accord with the prevailing distribution of political power, the latter theories
emphasize the importance of having mutually respectful discussions of the
153. See Bessette, supra note 68, at 1o6 (distinguishing between "the rule of the deliberative
majority" and "unreflective popular sentiments"); Sunstein, supra note 36, at 31-32 (claiming
that the American government "was not a scheme in which people impressed their private
preferences on the government," but was instead a deliberative democracy "in which the
selection of preferences was the object of the governmental process").
154. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 15, 56; Robert B. Reich, Public
Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1635-37 (1985)
("During the course of deliberation, people may discover both new information and new
perspectives about what is at stake in the decision before them. This may lead [them] not only
to modify their choice of means for achieving their ends, but perhaps to reconsider those
ends.").
155. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
156. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 95-127.
157. Staszewski, supra note 39, 1281.
158. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 6-7, 116-19.
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merits of the issues and ensuring that everyone's interests and perspectives
are taken into account in making decisions. The former theories are purely
procedural in nature,59 whereas the latter theories tend to be concerned
with both the procedural and substantive validity of authoritative policy
choices. 6oo Deliberative democratic theories therefore have a tendency,
above all, to seek to eliminate arbitrary governmental action, which includes
legal and policy decisions that fail to consider important aspects of a
problem, deviate from applicable legal requirements or the best available
empirical information, or cannot reasonably be justified to the opponents of
a chosen course of action.' 6 ' For the foregoing reasons, majoritarian and
pluralistic theories of democratic governance are primarily concerned with
who adheres (or how many people adhere) to particular views rather than
their substantive merits, whereas deliberative democratic theories tend to
maintain that "[u]ses of political power should be choice-sensitive and
status-insensitive,"' 62 meaning that the merits of a particular argument,
position, or policy choice are far more important than the identity of its
source.' 63
Deliberative democratic theories have several major advantages over
majoritarian or pluralistic conceptions of democratic governance. First,
policy decisions that are adopted pursuant to the requirements of
deliberative democratic theory are likely to be better than policy decisions
that deviate from (or are considered exempt from) those standards. 64 The
deliberative process is designed to pool the best available information on a
159. See id. at 15 ("Aggregative theorists thus believe that the collective outcomes produced
by their various methods need no further justification beyond the rationale for the method
itself.").
s6o. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 27-28; Cohen, supra note 38, at
187.
161. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
162. Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy's Attempt To Turn Politics into Law, 65
LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 5 , 1oo-os (2002).
163. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 144-45 ("If someone says that God
demands that fetal tissue not be used for research, and he also offers accessible reasons for not
using fetal tissue-reasons that happen to be based on what God tells him-then it is those
accessible reasons that satisfy the standard. The source of those reasons, even if inaccessible, is
irrelevant to their mutual justification."); Cohen, supra note 38, at 194 (explaining that
deliberative democratic theory's conception of equality means that "everyone with the
deliberative capacities-which is to say, more or less all human beings-has and is recognized as
having equal standing at each stage of the deliberative process").
164. SeeJames D. Fearon, Deliberation As Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note
36, at 44-46 (describing "six major reasons or arguments for discussing a matter before
reaching a decision on what to do"); Staszewski, supra note 39, at 1288 ("[T]he underlying
hope is that if we take unduly partial reasons for acting off the table, provide decision-makers
with the best available empirical information, and encourage them to resolve the problem
through deliberations that are conducted in a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation, the
final policy decision is likely to be the most legitimate and meritorious option under the
circumstances.").
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subject and require participants to explain why their proposals would
promote the public good. 65 The process thereby limits self-interested
proposals, 66 and helps participants to ascertain their own preferences on
the best course of action under the circumstances.'67 Because decision
makers are required to provide reasoned explanations for their decisions
that could reasonably be accepted by interested parties with competing
points of view, there are meaningful safeguards in place to prevent arbitrary
governmental action. Simply put, a deliberative process can be expected to
yield more justifiable decisions on the merits because the deliberative
process is, by definition, focused on the substantive merits of the decision.
This is not necessarily true of decision-making procedures that merely
aggregate the pre-political preferences of voters, elected representatives, or
interest groups. Contrary to the allegations of some critics, securing this
benefit does not require a single correct answer to controversial policy
questions, but it does depend on a belief in a well-informed decision
maker's ability reasonably to conclude that some policy choices are more
justifiable than others on a fairly regular basis.' 68
Second, policy decisions adopted pursuant to the requirements of
deliberative democratic theory are likely to be more legitimate than policy
decisions that deviate from those standards.' 69 This is true from the
perspective of the majority because the deliberative process provides most
decision makers with the information and competing perspectives they need
to ascertain their own preferences on the best resolution of specific policy
issues.70 The deliberative process sometimes builds a broad consensus
165. See Fearon, supra note 164, at 49-52 (recognizing that reasoned deliberation alleviates
the problem of "bounded rationality"; and that "faced with a complex problem, individuals
might wish to pool their limited capabilities through discussion and so increase the odds of
making a good choice"); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
166. See Elster, supra note 36, at too ("The mere fact that an assembly of individuals defines
its task as that of deliberation rather than mere force-based bargaining exercises a powerful
influence on the proposals and arguments that can be made."); Sunstein, supra note 1o8, at
1695 ("If naked preferences are forbidden .. . and the government is forced to invoke some
public value to justify its conduct, government behavior becomes constrained.").
167. See Manin, supra note 37, at 350 ("[D]uring political deliberation, individuals acquire
new perspectives not only with respect to possible solutions, but also with respect to their own
preferences.").
168. See Gutmann, supra note 5o, at 8-9 (describing deliberative democracy's aim of
"resolv[ing] moral conflict as justifiably as possible," and explaining that this requires
"attend[ing] to the content of the conflict to assess the justifiability of both the means of
reaching a resolution and the resolution itself").
169. See Staszewski, supra note 39, at 1282-84 (explaining how "reason giving" promotes
the legitimacy of governmental authority in a democracy).
170. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 157 ("When citizens bargain and
negotiate, they may learn how better to get what they wanted to begin with, but when they
deliberate, they can expand their knowledge, including their self-understanding of what is best
for them and their collective understanding of what will best serve their fellow citizens.");
Manin, supra note 37, at 349-50.
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around a particular solution, but even when such a consensus is lacking,
public officials should ordinarily be expected to have good reasons for
choosing certain courses of action over the available alternatives to make
legitimate policy decisions in a democracy.'-' Because deliberative
democratic theory requires a decision-making process that adequately
considers the interests and perspectives of minorities,172 as well as
substantive outcomes that "could be the object of a free and reasoned
agreement among equals,"s73 the resulting policy decisions can be
understood as collective choices that are presumptively legitimate from the
standpoint of minorities.174 Rebecca Brown has argued that from this
perspective, elected representatives may have a constitutionally mandated
obligation to consider the interests and perspectives of all of their
constituents and provide reasoned explanations for their policy decisions
that could reasonably be accepted by minorities whom they are obligated to
represent.'75 In any event, a theory that requires public officials to consider
the interests and perspectives of minorities will clearly have greater
democratic legitimacy from the minority's point of view than a theory that
assumes that all citizens have provided their blanket consent to be governed
by the unfiltered preferences of a majority, irrespective of the substantive
merits of those decisions.
Third, deliberative democratic theories are easier to monitor and
enforce in practice than their majoritarian or pluralistic competitors. The
advocates of majoritarian or pluralistic theories tend to envision a political
market that operates with an invisible hand like an economic market.'76 The
idea is that the need to maintain political support will lead elected officials
to make decisions that reflect the will of the people and that elected officials
171. See Gutmann, supra note 50, at 2 (claiming that reasoned deliberation has
noninstrumental value because it "expresses the basic democratic value of mutual respect
among free and equal citizens"); Thompson, supra note 36, at 504 ("[T]he primary conceptual
criterion for legitimacy, and the most important distinguishing characteristic of deliberation, is
mutual justification-presenting and responding to reasons intended to justify a political
decision.").
172. SeeManin, supra note 37, at 359-60.
173. Cohen, supra note 37, at 22.
174. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 222 ("[D]eliberative democracy is connected to political
community because the requirement of shared reasons for the exercise of political power-a
requirement absent from the aggregative view-itself expresses the full and equal membership
of all in the sovereign body responsible for authorizing the exercise of that power, and
establishes the common reason and will of that body."); see also Thompson, supra note 36, at
502-04 (discussing deliberative democracy's focus on "the need for a collective decision in a
state of disagreement").
175. Brown, supra note 5o, at 39-43.
176. See, e.g., ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269-83 (Harper & Bros. 3 d ed. 1950)
(1942).
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will be voted out of office if they deviate from this course of action.'77 Yet, it
has become increasingly clear that there are significant "market failures" in
the world of politics and that periodic elections are not dependable
mechanisms for ensuring that public officials implement the will of the
people on most specific policy matters.'78 Moreover, any effort to correct
these market failures by developing more accurate ways to assess the
majority's preferences, reducing or eliminating unjustifiable inequalities in
political influence, and identifying and adopting more reliable mechanisms
for ensuring that elected representatives follow their constituents'
instructions would be an overwhelmingly daunting task.179 In contrast,
although no one would contend that deliberative democratic theories are
currently implemented in their ideal fashion, such theories do ironically
have the potential to be relatively "self-correcting." Deliberative democratic
theory depends upon interested public officials and citizens to participate in
the deliberative process, to present competing points of view, and to
evaluate and potentially criticize policy decisions and their proffered
justifications, as well as potentially to seek legal or political reform. This
system can work if the lawmaking process is accessible and transparent,
public officials provide reasoned explanations for their policy decisions on a
consistent basis, and the deliberative process meaningfully engages a broad
range of viewpoints.so While there are no guarantees that these conditions
will be met, deliberative democratic theory stands a much more realistic
chance of succeeding on its own terms-and being able to identify and
rectify its own shortcomings in practice-than its majoritarian or pluralistic
counterparts.'5 '
177. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 14.
178. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 6o, at 50-54 (discussing prominent critiques of
pluralism); supra Part II.B.
179. Similar problems contributed to the demise of interest group representation theory as
the dominant theory of legitimacy for the administrative state. See Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-
Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REv. 271, 283-84 (1986) ("[The interest
group representation model] foundered in light of four considerations: the fact that the
relevant representatives were self-selecting; the weaknesses in the notion that the purpose of
administration is to aggregate preferences; the unlikelihood that, even if preference-
aggregation were desirable, it would be accomplished by a judicially-administered system of
interest-representation; and the possibility that such procedures would impose costs not
justified by improvements in administrative outcomes.").
s8o. Staszewski, supra note 39, at 1291-92 (acknowledging that existing inequalities in
political knowledge and participation are troubling, but claiming that they are not fatal to
deliberative democratic theory).
181. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 357-58 ("The gap between the theory
and practice of deliberative democracy is narrower than in most other conceptions of
democracy . . . . [Tihe theory of deliberative democracy partly constitutes its own practice: the
arguments with which democratic theorists justify the theory are of the same kind that
democratic citizens use to justify decisions and policies in practice."); GUTMANN & THOMPSON,
supra note 35, at 57-58 (describing the "self-correcting capacity of deliberative democracy").
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As explained above, deliberative democratic theory is more consistent
with the structure of the American Constitution than majoritarian or
pluralistic conceptions of democratic governance. 8 2 Deliberative democratic
theory also provides the best explanation for the existing version of the
arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review. Professor Watts correctly
recognizes in the first sentence of her article that "[a] t its core, arbitrary and
capricious review, or 'hard look' review as it is sometimes called, enables
courts to ensure that administrative agencies justify their decisions with
adequate reasons."' 83 Reason giving is, of course, also the central element of
deliberative democratic theory.' 84 Shortly after the Supreme Court endorsed
hard-look judicial review, Cass Sunstein published a classic law review article
that recognized that this doctrinal innovation was "classically republican"
because of its requirements of "deliberation" and "reasoned analysis."' 85
Professor Sunstein perceptively described the underlying rationale for this
development as follows:
Reviewing courts are attempting to ensure that the agency has not
merely responded to political pressure but that it is instead
deliberating in order to identify and implement the public values
that should control the controversy. A principal concern is that
without the procedural and substantive requirements of the hard-
look doctrine, the governing values may be subverted in the
enforcement process through the domination of powerful private
groups.'86
Mark Seidenfeld subsequently argued that "the political theory of civic
republicanism, with its emphasis on citizen participation in government and
deliberative decision making, provides the best justification for the
American bureaucracy,",s? and that "the paradigmatic process for agency
formulation of policy-informal rulemaking-is specifically geared to
advance the requirements of civic republican theory."'88 I have previously
pointed out that:
182. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text; see also Bessette, supra note 68, at 102;
Sunstein, supra note 36, at 29.
183. Watts, supra note 2, at 5.
184. Thompson, supra note 36, at 498 ("At the core of all theories of deliberative
democracy is what may be called a reason-giving requirement.").
185. Sunstein, supra note 36, at 56-58. "Civic republican" political theory is widely viewed
as the predecessor to modem versions of deliberative democratic theory. See supra note 36.
186. Sunstein, supra note 36, at 63 (citation omitted). Sunstein observed that the governing
"values may be found in the statute, which must of course be taken as authoritative." Id. When
"the statute is ambiguous, [however,] the values must be ascertained by the agency through a
more open-ended process." Id.
187. Seidenfeld, supra note 36, at 1512.
188. Id. at 15 6o.
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The net result of APA procedures and "hard-look" judicial review
under State Farm is to encourage and enforce republican ideals of
deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in the administrative
lawmaking process. Those ideals are generally assumed to be
satisfied in the traditional legislative process by virtue of
representation and the structural safeguards of bicameralism,
presentment, and separation of powers that are enshrined in the
Constitution.'5 o
In any event, hard-look judicial review is perhaps the prime example of a
well-established legal doctrine that has firmly embraced and squarely
adopted the most fundamental principles of deliberative democratic theory.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that agencies, courts, and commentators
have traditionally understood arbitrary and capricious review as a process
that should focus on the substantive merits of an agency's policy choices
rather than other political considerations.190 Moreover, proposals to alter
the arbitrary and capricious standard by giving agencies credit for justifying
their policy decisions based on political reasons would naturally strike
advocates of deliberative democratic theory as inherently misguided and
potentially quite destabilizing to the basic quality and legitimacy of the
modern regulatory state.
On the other hand, political reasons are not necessarily irrelevant to
administrative decision making under the principles of deliberative
democratic theory. For example, nearly everyone agrees that agencies
routinely have limited resources that inhibit their ability to fully enforce
their statutory authority, and that agencies must therefore establish sensible
priorities that will almost inevitably reflect some political considerations.'9'
189. Staszewski, supra note 65, at 443-44 (footnote omitted); see also Criddle, supra note 8o,
at 484 ( "The fiduciary model [of administrative law] favors promoting deliberative rationality
in agency rulemaking through mandatory reason-giving requirements backed by judicial
review."); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutional Common Law, 110
COLUM. L. REv. 479, 490 (2010) (identifying hard-look review as a primary example of "the
ways that constitutional concerns have shaped the development of ordinary administrative law
doctrines"); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J.
387, 388 (explaining that hard-look review "is best understood as a form of heightened scrutiny
of the rationale of agency decisions and that the doctrine of separation of powers requires such
scrutiny because of the unique position of administrative agencies in terms of the constitutional
structure of government").
190. See Watts, supra note 2, at 14-32 (documenting the current understanding of the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review).
191. See, e.g., Biber, supra note 140, at 18 ("Priority setting is ... central to the role that an
Executive Branch, headed by an elected officer, plays in our constitutional system of
government."); see also Staszewski, supra note 138, at 385-92 (discussing the Supreme Court's
adoption of a presumption against judicial review of nonenforcement decisions based, in part,
on these considerations; and recognizing that "[elven the sharpest critics of the Court's current
approach to agency inaction have recognized the validity of these practical concerns").
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Moreover, deliberative democratic theorists typically agree that
majoritarian preferences can legitimately play a tie-breaking function when
public officials are choosing between two or more equally valid policy
alternatives.192 Nonetheless, deliberative democratic theorists have not
provided a clear account of the precise role of political preferences in
agency decision making. The next Subpart therefore assesses the
appropriate role of political reasons in agency decision making from the
perspective of deliberative democratic theory.
B. THE ROLE OF POIJTICAL REASONS IN DELIBERA TIVE DEMOCRATIC THEORY
Deliberative democratic theory recognizes that political preferences and
priorities have a legitimate role to play in policymaking in many situations
when certain conditions are met. This issue has been addressed by some
commentators in discussions of the role of voting in deliberative democratic
theory. Contrary to the assertions of some prominent critics,193 deliberative
democratic theorists have emphasized that voting is essential to their
theories of democratic governance because reasonable disagreement will
frequently remain after reasoned deliberation has taken place, and the act
of voting marks the close of an episode of reasoned deliberation, allows each
participant to express her views on the merits of the relevant proposals, and
ultimately results in political action with potentially significant
consequences.'94 The need to make decisions with real policy consequences
is what distinguishes political deliberation from academic discussion.'95 As
Amy Gutmann has explained, "Deliberation is more accurately understood
as the give and take of public argument with the aim of making an action-
guiding decision that can be justified to the people bound by it."196 Because
192. See, eg., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 141-42 (describing the
circumstances in which "the deliberative principle of accountability justifies or allows deference
to popular opinion"); Cohen, supra note 38, at 197 (acknowledging that "the fact that a
proposal has majority support" can "count as a reason for endorsing it" in some situations); see
also Staszewski, supra note 39, at 1292 ("The apparent preferences of a majority might ... play a
tie-breaking function in the absence of any need for structural safeguards to protect minority
interests.").
193. SeeJeremy Waldron, Deliberation, Disagreement, and Voting, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 210, 212 ("[T]here is something embarrassing about
voting in a deliberative context-or at least that is the impression we are given-and those
committed to deliberation will often go to extraordinary lengths to avoid it. Voting seems like
an admission of failure, for it shows that a discussion based on the merits has failed to resolve
the issue.").
194. See Gutmann, supra note 56, at 228-29 ("Voting is essential to the ideal of deliberative
democracy . . . because (1) people reasonably disagree during and after deliberating on
political issues, (2) people's reasonable disagreements ought to be respected, and (3) one way
of respecting those disagreements-and respecting people as political equals-is to count all
their views in the final voting.").
195. See id. at 233-34.
196. Id. at 233.
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policy decisions must be made, theories of "deliberative democracy should
dovetail with voting."'97
While deliberative democratic theorists do not necessarily believe that
majority rule is required by democracy,'15 they do recognize that abiding by
the results of a majority vote would be an appropriate decision-making
procedure in many situations.'99 Deliberative democratic theorists also
recognize that popular opinion can be a significant factor in making policy
decisions in similar circumstances.2oo The difference, however, is that while
majoritarian and pluralistic theories of democracy understand the
aggregation of preferences or the weighing of competing interest group
pressures as the only legitimate goals of policymaking, deliberative
democratic theory views a majority vote or deference to public opinion as "a
closure device" when reasonable disagreement remains after a period of
reasoned deliberation if no fundamental rights or liberties are implicated.2o,
Thus, while majoritarianism and pluralism are purely procedural theories of
democracy, which are typically silent on "the evidence, arguments, and
claims that are considered before a vote is taken";202 deliberative democratic
theory contains both procedural and substantive elements and, therefore,
recognizes the need to attend to the content of a policy dispute "to assess the
justifiability of both the means of reaching a resolution and the resolution
itself."20s This means, for example, that "deliberative democra[tic] [theory]
has no problem saying that what the majority decides, even after
deliberating, need not be right."204
At the end of the day, deliberative democratic theory is willing to
embrace the results of a vote or defer to public opinion if several conditions
are met. First, an adequate deliberative process must have preceded the final
97. Id.
198. See id. at 232-34 ("If a non-majoritarian decision-making rule is more likely to produce
justifiable decisions, or likely to produce more justifiable decisions, than the available
alternatives, and if that rule is consistent with the civic equality of individuals, then there is good
reason for democrats not to insist on majority rule.").
199. See id. at 233 (acknowledging that "a case may be made for a presumption in favor of
majority rule after due deliberation" in circumstances of reasonable disagreement); see also
supra note 192 and accompanying text.
200. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 140-42. Gutmann and Thompson
emphasize, however, that elected officials are not required to defer to popular opinion under
conditions of reasonable disagreement, and that they should instead feel free to exercise
independentjudgment. Id. at 141-42.
201. RICHARDSON, supra note 37, at 203; see also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at
27-33; GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 95-124, 130-35; RICHARDSON, supra note 37,
at 167-69, 203-13; Cohen, supra note 38, at 197-98, 212-21; Gutmann, supra note 5o, at 3.
202. Gutmann, supra note 50, at 5.
203. Id. at 9.
204. GUTMANN &THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 135.
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vote or policy decision.20s Second, the resulting decision may not violate any
fundamental rights or liberties, as determined by the principles of
deliberative democratic theory.o 6 Finally, the decision may not be arbitrary
or capricious on the merits, meaning that the participants in the deliberative
process must consider the interests and perspectives of everyone who will be
affected by the decision, and the decision must be justified by the arguments
and evidence presented and supported by a reasoned explanation.207
Because any assessment of whether these conditions are met will necessarily
turn on the particular circumstances and precise content of a policy dispute,
deliberative democratic theory tends to be sympathetic to external review
mechanisms such as judicial review and to emphasize the provisional nature
of most policy choices in a democracy.
Most discussions of the proper roles of voting, majority rule, and public
opinion in deliberative democratic theory have been conducted in the
abstract or appear to be focused primarily on the legislative process.
Although these discussions are instructive for purposes of assessing the role
of political reasons in administrative law, decision making by administrative
agencies is distinctive in several important ways. First, federal agency officials
are not elected but are instead appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and they can typically be removed from office by
the President for any reason.os Second, agencies can only exercise the
205. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 33 ("To assess the justifiability of a
procedure in particular instances, even a procedure as widely accepted as majority rule, we
need to know what kind of discussion took place, who participated, what arguments they
presented, and how each responded to the claims of the others."); RICHARDSON, supra note 37,
at 169 ("The application of majority rule formalizes an agreement that has been forged by
deliberation."); Cohen, supra note 38, at 197 ("[W]hen people do appeal to considerations that
are quite generally recognized as having considerable weight, then the fact that a proposal has
majority support will itself commonly count as a reason for endorsing it."); Gutmann, supra
note 50, at 4-5 (recognizing that "[m]ajority rule may ... be the best procedural standard for
resolving many political disputes," but claiming that "[i]t would be a serious mistake to judge
conflict resolution only by its voting rules and not also by how the decisionmaking is designed
and by whether decisionmakers are encouraged to deliberate about their disagreements before
voting"); Manin, supra note 37, at 359 ("Because [a majority vote] comes at the close of a
deliberative process in which everyone was able to take part, choose among several solutions,
and remain free to approve or refuse the conclusions developed from the argument, the result
carries legitimacy."); see also Bessette, supra note 68, at so6- i i (describing the concept of the
"deliberative majority" that was embraced by the framers of the Constitution).
2o6. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 3o ("A majority vote alone cannot
legitimate an outcome when the basic liberties or opportunities of an individual are at stake.");
Cohen, supra note 38, at 201-07 (developing "the thesis that democracy-on the deliberative
interpretation of collective choice-must ensure religious, expressive, and moral liberties").
207. See supra notes 36-4o and accompanying text (describing the chief tenets of
deliberative democratic theory and its underlying goal of preventing arbitrary governmental
action).
2o8. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 (solo) ("Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to
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authority that has been delegated to them by Congress, and they are, in
turn, responsible for the successful implementation of their statutory
mandates.lo9 Third, agencies typically have technical expertise in the areas
they are responsible for regulating, and they often develop substantial
experience in implementing their programmatic responsibilities.2 While
the agency heads will typically change with each new presidential
administration, most agencies have a staff of career civil servants with
technical expertise and experience, as well as an institutional memory.---
Fourth, agencies are subject to a variety of forms of political oversight,
including presidential review of rulemaking by the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"), hearings on Capitol Hill, the annual
budget appropriations process, and informal lobbying efforts by the White
House and members of Congress.212 Fifth, executive branch agencies do not
ordinarily vote when they make policy decisions, but rather announce their
decisions in the general statement of basis and purpose that accompanies a
legislative rule or the opinion that accompanies an order.-3 Their decisions
therefore have the appearance of being made by a single individual, such as
the agency head, or through a consensual, institutional decision-making
process within the agency.21 4 These characteristics of agencies must be taken
into account in any effort to ascertain the appropriate role of political
reasons in administrative law from the perspective of deliberative democratic
theory. The final Part of this Article explains how political reasons could be
given a more prominent role in administrative law from this perspective and
evaluates whether this reform would be desirable.
empower the President to keep these [executive] officers accountable-by removing them from
office, if necessary.").
209. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("It is axiomatic that
an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority
delegated by Congress.").
210. See Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1309 (2009) ("Agencies are widely viewed to be better suited to
administrative tasks than the legislature due to institutional qualities such as professionalism,
administrative expertise, subject-matter expertise, and experience.").
21 1. SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 579 (2002) ("The agency's career staff provide an ongoing
repository not only of substantive knowledge but also of decisionmaking experience, so that
agencies ... need not reinvent the wheel every four or eight years.").
212. See Bradley Lipton, Note, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 1 19 YALE
L.J. 2o96, 2101-20 (2010) (canvassing recent literature on the political accountability of the
bureaucracy, and explaining that agency policies are "subject to significant oversight by political
officials in both the executive and legislative branches").
213. See5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6) (2006); id. § 553(c).
214. Cf MICHAEL AsiMOw & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
91-92 (3 d ed. 2009) (describing the institutional model of agency decision making).
Independent agencies that are headed by bipartisan, multimember commissions do, however,
frequently vote on their policy decisions. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 11, at 1 o1-02 (describing
independent agencies' functional and structural characteristics).
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IV. POLITICAL REASONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
While the current version of arbitrary and capricious review is
consistent with the core principles of deliberative democratic theory,
political reasons could legitimately play a larger and much more transparent
role in agency decision making from this theoretical perspective. For
starters, there is little question that communications between the White
House or Congress and agency decision makers regarding the manner in
which an agency should exercise its rulemaking authority should ordinarily
be disclosed on the public record. As Professor Mendelson has shown, there
are good reasons to think that the political influence of the White House has
a significant impact on the legislative rules that are promulgated by
agencies, but the nature of this influence is not ordinarily disclosed by either
the White House or agencies-even though there are executive orders in
place that appear to compel this result.215 The existence of, and failure to
disclose, political influence on agency decision making by members of
Congress is almost certainly prevalent, as well.216 Professor Mendelson's
proposal to require agencies "to summarize the critical details of...
executive review positions and explain the extent to which those positions
are connected to the agency's ultimate decision"217 would therefore
undoubtedly be a significant improvement from the perspective of
deliberative democratic theory. Agencies should also be required to
summarize the positions that were taken by members of Congress on
proposed rules, and to explain how congressional input influenced their
final decisions. Similarly, proposals to require the disclosure of significant ex
parte contacts between politicians and agency officials during informal
rulemaking should also be endorsed from this perspective." 5 The bottom
line is that in order to facilitate greater transparency in the administrative
process, a summary of any communications between the agency and political
officials that are directly related to the decision should, at the very least, be
included with the other comments in the administrative record.
Accordingly, Congress should ideally amend the APA to require this result,
215. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1146-59; see also supra note 93 (citing sources that report
the results of empirical studies on the White House's influence on agencies).
2 16. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006)
(describing Congress's involvement in the administration of the law, and discussing some of the
potential implications for administrative law).
217. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1164.
218. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Pane OMB Influence over
Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 6 11, 615 (2002) (suggesting that external checks would be
useful "to guard against potentially inappropriate ... influence over the rulemaking process");
Sidney A. Shapiro, Two Cheers for HBO: The Problem of the Nonpublic Record, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
853, 855 (2002) ("[A]gencies and the White House should reveal private communications of
central relevance to ... rulemaking proceedings. . . .").
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and the White House and executive branch agencies should comply with
existing executive orders.
The real issue, therefore, is whether and when agencies should receive
credit for justifying their policy decisions with political reasons during the
course of hard-look judicial review. The next Subpart provides one answer to
this question from the perspective of deliberative democratic theory, while
the final Subpart suggests that it may ultimately be a bad idea to give
agencies credit for justifying their policy decisions with political reasons-
even if, in theory, the degree of such credit could be properly
circumscribed.
A. THE STATE FARM Two-STEP
Deliberative democratic theory maintains that an adequate deliberative
process must precede the assessment of, or reliance upon, majoritarian
preferences or public opinion in making authoritative policy decisions. In
the context of administrative rulemaking,2 9 this means that an agency
should conduct a public notice-and-comment proceeding that focuses on
the best way of implementing its delegated statutory authority on the merits
before taking into account other potentially relevant political
considerations. If elected officials want to participate in this process by
providing substantive arguments and supporting evidence regarding their
conceptions of the best ways to implement an agency's statutory authority,
they should be more than welcome to submit comments, which must be
considered by the agency on their merits along with all of the other
arguments and evidence in the administrative record. The agency should
take all of the arguments and evidence into account in reaching a decision
about the best course of action under the circumstances. The agency should
also provide a reasoned explanation for its decision, which responds to the
major issues of policy that were ventilated and could reasonably be accepted
by interested parties with competing points of view. In other words, the
agency should reach a decision about the best way to implement its statutory
authority and explain that decision "in technocratic, statutory, or
scientifically driven terms, not political terms," just as they currently do.220
If an agency's assessment of the best course of action under the
circumstances is feasible, then the agency should promulgate a final rule
that implements this particular policy decision. When an agency reasonably
concludes, however, that its preferred course of action is infeasible because
21g. The extent to which this proposal could be extended to formal rulemaking,
adjudication, or guidance documents is therefore beyond the scope of this Article. It bears
noting, however, that due process considerations may render political considerations more
problematic in the adjudication context. See Kevin M. Stack, Agency Statutory Interpretation and
Policymaking Form, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 225, 227-33 (describing the different role of politics
in agency rulemaking and adjudication).
220. Watts, supra note 2, at 5 (describing the existing practice).
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of limitations on its statutory authority or its own competing programmatic
responsibilities, then the agency should acknowledge that it has chosen to
pursue a less desirable alternative and explain why it has done so. The
agency should then evaluate the existing alternatives on the merits and
identify the best remaining solution that is feasible under the circumstances.
Political reasons that do not bear directly on the merits, such as political
preferences or public opinion, should only come into play when the best
decision is infeasible and two or more roughly equal alternatives are
available.221 At this point, the agency should identify any political reasons
that it considered and explain how they affected its analysis. As explained
above, a summary of any communications between the agency and political
officials that are directly related to the decision should be included with the
other comments in the administrative record as a matter of course.
Under this framework, the first step of the analysis would involve an
agency's assessment of the best course of action under the circumstances
and whether this policy decision could feasibly be adopted, and the second
step would involve an agency's identification of the best remaining
alternative if it reasonably concluded that it could not implement its
statutory authority in the most effective manner. If the agency identified two
or more roughly equal alternatives in the second step of this analysis, it
could take into account legitimate political considerations that are not
directly related to the merits of the policy dispute in selecting from among
this set of options. Those political reasons, however, must reflect
considerations that are relevant to a plausible conception of the public
good, rather than the naked preferences or self-interested goals of elected
officials, because only the former types of considerations could reasonably
be accepted by everyone who will be affected by the decision.222 Thus, for
example, an agency could rely on reputable evidence that a majority of the
public favored one policy option over another to select the more popular
proposal. Similarly, an agency could rely on the White House's transparently
disclosed preference for one policy option over another on the grounds that
the chosen option is more consistent with the President's philosophy and
priorities, assuming that those assertions are true and the President has
221. The State Farm two-step would therefore provide a potential mechanism for agencies to
incorporate values expressed by the general public into their decision making during notice-
and-comment rulemaking. Cf Mendelson, supra note 149, at 1372 (claiming that agencies
should engage "in some way" with value-laden comments from the general public, "especially
when they arrive in large numbers"). While it is also possible that value-laden comments from
the general public could persuade an agency to change its mind about the best course of action
on the merits under the first step of this framework, such comments could potentially be too
general to provide much meaningful guidance on the detailed and complex issues that are
typically resolved in rulemaking.
222. See, e.g., Elster, supra note 3 6, at 1o (describing deliberative democracy's norm of
impartiality); Sunstein, supra note 1o8, at 1693-1704 (distinguishing between naked
preferences and public values).
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articulated a reasonably plausible conception of the public good that
informs such determinations. In contrast, an agency could not rely on the
President's bald assertion of authority, naked preference for one policy
choice over another, or partisan political considerations because those
political reasons could not reasonably be accepted by everyone, including
the President's political opponents.
One might object that this analytical framework does not provide
enough room for agencies to justify their policy decisions with political reasons
from a deliberative democratic perspective. First, agencies might sometimes
conclude that there is more than one equally effective way to implement
their delegated statutory authority. Why should they be required to identify
the best way to implement their statutory mandates or be precluded from
considering public opinion or the President's philosophy or priorities in
those circumstances? Second, legitimate political considerations, including
public opinion and the President's philosophy or priorities, may strongly
favor an option that an agency considers inferior on the merits. Why
shouldn't these legitimate political considerations be allowed to trump an
agency's assessment of the best way to implement its statutory authority
under these circumstances? Finally, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for
agency officials (or other human beings) to disentangle their assessment of
the merits of various policy options from other political considerations.23
How could political considerations realistically come into play only in
limited circumstances under the second part of this analytical framework?
The two-pronged answer to each of these well-taken objections is that
such limitations on the use of political reasons in agency decision making
are necessary to ensure the truth orientation of the administrative process
and attend to the unique characteristics of administrative agencies.254
Requiring agencies to identify the best way to implement their statutory
authority under the circumstances does not imply that there is a single
correct answer to questions of regulatory policy, but it does suggest that
agencies have been delegated the responsibility to use their expertise and
experience to make their own best judgments regarding the most effective
ways of achieving their programmatic objectives and thereby promote the
public good. Simply stating that there is a range of satisfactory options, and
223. See generally EDLEY, supra note 7, at 72-95 (criticizing administrative law's "trichotomy"
of politics, science, and adjudicatory fairness; and claiming that all agency decisions have
political, scientific, and legal dimensions that are difficult or impossible to disentangle).
224. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text. Compare RICHARDSON, Supra note 37, at
207 (pointing out that one of the primary dangers associated with incorporating majority rule
into deliberative democratic theory is that "knowing that an issue will be settled by majority rule
can stunt the truth orientation of debate" because "[i]nstead of attempting to figure out how
their pet causes and concerns ought to be balanced with those of other groups, factions often
simply push for what they can get, subject only to the need of building a winning coalition"),
with Waldron, supra note 193, at 213 ("The need for majority support is what makes me take
the interests of others into account in the proposals that I make.").
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that the agency has chosen the alternative that is most consistent with public
opinion or the President's preferences and priorities, would be too easy of a
way out and would fail to satisfy the agency's statutory responsibilities.
Agencies should instead be strongly encouraged to make an independent
assessment of the best course of action on the merits from among the range
of serious alternatives that were presented during the deliberative process.2 2 5
Similarly, political considerations should not be allowed to trump an
agency's assessment of the best way of implementing its statutory authority
because this would undermine the truth orientation of the administrative
process and conflict with the agency's statutory responsibilities. In contrast,
asking agency officials to separate their assessment of the merits of various
policy options from other political considerations promotes the truth
orientation of the administrative process and the achievement of an agency's
statutory responsibilities, even if this will sometimes prove difficult to
accomplish in practice.
In sum, this two-step framework would encourage agency officials to
remain focused on the best ways of carrying out their programmatic
responsibilities on the merits, and would thereby promote the truth
orientation of the administrative process. The framework would also
encourage agencies to use their experience and substantive expertise to
make independent judgments regarding the best ways to implement their
statutory authority, and would thereby respect the public-regarding reasons
for delegating policymaking authority to administrative agencies in the first
place. At the same time, the framework would recognize that agency
decision making could legitimately be influenced by the political
preferences of elected officials and the public in a narrow range of
circumstances. The framework would thereby complement legitimate means
of political oversight without undermining the ability of administrative
agencies to perform their core functions or carry out their statutory
responsibilities.
Of course, even when policy decisions are made pursuant to an
adequate deliberative process, they must also be consistent with
fundamental rights and liberties and nonarbitrary on the merits to meet the
requirements of deliberative democratic theory.226 Judicial review should
therefore routinely be available to assess whether an agency's policy
decisions comport with constitutional requirements. Moreover, final agency
decisions should be subject to judicial review to ascertain whether they are
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law. Although judicial review of final agency action is presumptively
225. Under this proposed framework, it would be unreasonable for an agency to identify an
alternative that clearly exceeded its statutory authority or was facially impracticable as the best
course of action and then to choose from among the remaining alternatives based on political
reasons.
226. See supra notes 2o6-07 and accompanying text.
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available on these grounds under the APA,227 the scope of judicial review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard would need to be modified to
some extent to accommodate this proposed two-step framework.
In particular, the judiciary should continue to require agencies to
provide reasoned explanations for their decisions, but the precise mode of
analysis would need to be reformulated to accord with the foregoing two-
step framework. Thus, if an agency adopted its conception of the best course
of action on the merits under the circumstances, the judiciary would merely
need to ascertain whether this decision was reasonable in light of the
administrative record. In other words, the current version of hard-look
judicial review should be applied. If, however, an agency concluded that the
best course of action on the merits was infeasible and adopted an inferior
policy alternative, the scope of judicial review would be slightly more
complicated. Specifically, a court would need to ascertain (1) whether the
agency's decision to deviate from its own conception of the best course of
action was reasonable under the circumstances, (2) whether the alternative
that the agency adopted was reasonable in light of the administrative record,
and (3) whether the agency provided an adequate justification for deviating
from the best course of action and adopting its chosen alternative. The
judiciary should verify that the agency only deviated from its own conception
of the best course of action on the merits based on an accurate conception
of the limits of its own statutory authority or budgetary limitations, or a
reasonable decision to divert more resources to other problems that fall
within the agency's programmatic responsibilities. Moreover, the judiciary
should verify that the agency's decision to adopt a second-best alternative
was based solely on a reasonable assessment of the next-best means of
implementing its statutory authority, as well as legitimate political
considerations, including public opinion and presidential priorities. In any
event, the judiciary should vacate and remand an agency's policy decisions
whenever its choices were not supported by the evidence in the
administrative record or the agency relied on illegitimate political
considerations. This framework for analysis-let's call it "the State Farm two-
step"-would provide a novel method of implementing the arbitrary and
capricious standard of judicial review under the APA, which would
incorporate a greater role for political reasons in administrative law while
remaining consistent with deliberative democratic theory.
It may be useful to consider an example of how the different
approaches to political reasons might play out in a concrete case. In 1979,
the EPA considered whether to set the maximum permissible level of
emissions for sulfur dioxide from coal-fired power plants at 0.55 lb/MMBtu
or 1.2 lb/MMBtu.218 When the agency adopted the less stringent standard
227. See5 U.S.C. § 706 (2oo6); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1967).
228. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 385 (D.C. Cir. ig81).
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(1.2 lb/MMBtu), environmental groups challenged its decision on
procedural grounds because the EPA was subject to a blitz of undisclosed ex
parte contacts by political officials and industry representatives after the
public notice-and-comment period had ended.2.9 In Sierra Club, the D.C.
Circuit upheld the agency's decision, even though it implicitly conceded
that (1) EPA would have chosen the lower limit but for the undisclosed
political influence, and (2) the actual reasons for the agency's decision
differed dramatically from the publicly disclosed reasons.2 3o The court was
persuaded that the agency provided a reasoned explanation for its decision
based on the administrative record, and the court was therefore
unconcerned that other political reasons may have influenced the EPA's
decision.231
But what were those political reasons, were they legitimate, and would
the agency have been entitled to more credit during judicial review if it had
justified its decision on those bases? Because the details of the ex parte
contacts were undisclosed, we can only speculate regarding their contents.
Nonetheless, Richard Pierce has recently provided a plausible description of
the likely nature of those conversations given the economic and political
climate in 1979.-32 Pierce claims, for example, that President Carter's
domestic-policy advisor likely endorsed the less stringent emissions standard
and reminded EPA officials that (1) a general election was scheduled for a
few months after the EPA's expected decision on this matter; (2) polls
showed dissatisfaction with the level of inflation and unemployment; (3)
polls also showed Ronald Reagan with an edge over President Carter, and
Republican candidates running ahead of Democratic candidates for
Congress; (4) a decision to adopt the 0.55 lb/MMBtu limit would increase
unemployment across Appalachia and increase electricity rates across the
Midwest, two regions President Carter and Democratic candidates for
Congress had to carry to retain control of the White House and Congress;
and (5) Administrator Costle was a loyal Democratic supporter of President
Carter, as well as an at-will employee of the President.23 3 Consistent with the
preceding analysis, all of this information would be relevant to EPA's decision
under the political control model of administrative legitimacy.34 While
Professors Mendelson and Watts would plainly treat an agency's reliance on
the most partisan aspects of this information with disfavor, it is not entirely
clear where they would draw the line in their efforts to give politics a place
in agency decision making under these circumstances.
229. Id. at 384, 387.
230. Id.at396- 4 1o.
231. Id.
232. Pierce, supra note 21, at 122-24.
233. Id. at 123 -2 4 .
234. See supra notes 1o4-o7 and accompanying text.
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From a deliberative perspective, the information conveyed by President
Carter's domestic policy advisor can be divided usefully into three
categories. First, the claim that a decision to adopt the 0.55 lb/MMBtu limit
would increase unemployment across Appalachia and increase electricity
rates across the Midwest goes to the merits of the appropriate emissions
standard (and is therefore not a "political reason" at all, under my
definition),255 and this argument should be placed on the record and
evaluated along with other relevant considerations. It bears noting that
Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler have suggested that the economic
analysis underlying these predictions may have been flawed,236 which
illustrates why it is important to subject the arguments of public officials to
critique and potential refutation. Second, several of the reasons provided by
the domestic policy advisor for adopting the less stringent emissions
standard would be irrelevant under deliberative democratic theory because
they could not reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens with
fundamentally competing perspectives. These irrelevant reasons include
statements that (1) a general election was scheduled for a few months after
the EPA's expected decision, (2) Republican presidential and congressional
candidates held an edge over Democrats, (3) President Carter and the
Democrats needed to carry the Midwest and Appalachia to retain control of
the White House and Congress, (4) and Administrator Costle was a loyal
supporter and at-will employee of President Carter. 3 7 Third, the claim that
public opinion polls showed dissatisfaction with the level of inflation and
unemployment would be relevant to the agency's decision under the second
step of my proposed analytical framework if the EPA's preferred emissions
standard was not feasible and a more lenient emissions standard would be
equally effective in fulfilling the agency's statutory responsibilities. The
agency's potentially legitimate reliance on public opinion polls is unlikely to
arise in this situation, however, because (1) there is nothing to suggest that
the EPA's preferred emissions standard would not be feasible, (2) there is
no reason to think that a less stringent emissions standard would be equally
effective, and (3) the EPA should already have considered the impact of its
proposed emissions standard on the levels of inflation and unemployment in
reaching a decision on the merits. Accordingly, the EPA's emissions
standard should not be influenced by any of the political reasons allegedly
proffered by President Carter's domestic policy advisor in this particular
situation.
235. See supra text accompanying note 48.
236. BRUCE A. AcKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 99 (1981)
(explaining that the negative impact of a 0.55 lb/MMBtu emissions standard was significantly
overstated, and the inadequacies of the underlying analysis "were well recognized by the EPA
bureaucracy").
237. Pierce, supra note 21, at 123-24.
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I want to emphasize a couple of lessons that emerge from this example.
First, the differences between an undiluted political control model and a
deliberative democratic approach to administrative law and political reasons
are profound. In this regard, Professor Pierce contends that all of the
political reasons that were provided in the foregoing hypothetical should
have been considered by the EPA (along with a number of others), and that
none of those political reasons should have been disclosed on the
administrative record.2s He justifies this conclusion on the grounds that the
presidential control model "is better than the alternatives,"2s9 and that:
It is impossible for an agency to engage in candid explanations of
an invariably complicated and inherently political policy decision
in our legal culture without taking a high risk that a court will
reverse the decision or that a naive public will react negatively to
the political nature of the decision-making process. 240
On the contrary, a deliberative democratic theory of administrative
legitimacy would suggest that (i) all of these political reasons should have
been disclosed on the administrative record; (2) the agency should have
considered all of the reasons that focused on the merits of its decision along
with other relevant information; and (3) other political preferences or
priorities should only be considered, if at all, under narrow circumstances
that were not present in this particular case. While administrative decision
making is "invariably complicated and inherently political,"241 that does not
mean that its true nature should be "shrouded from public view,"242 or that
the federal judiciary and other interested members of the public are
incapable of understanding it.
Second, the practical differences between the State Farm two-step and
Mendelson's and Watts's proposals to give politics a place in agency decision
making are relatively subtle but real. Political preferences and priorities
would potentially play a much larger role under their proposals because they
seem to view those considerations as relevant whenever an agency addresses
questions of value in areas of scientific uncertainty, whereas the State Farm
two-step would give priority to an agency's preferred solution whenever it
could feasibly be implemented and would arguably be more effective on the
merits. I am therefore confident that the State Farm two-step is more
coherent in theory and would be more attractive in practice than other
proposals to give politics a place in agency decision making. There is no
238. Id. at 124.
239. Id. at 113.
240. Id. at 124,
241. Id.
242. Id. at 121 (discussing the limits of transparency and claiming, for example, that "the
ubiquitous process of presidential jawboning of agencies in the rulemaking process should
continue to be shrouded from public view").
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question, however, that the implementation of this analytical framework
would be relatively complicated and would create line-drawing problems
that do not exist under the current version of hard-look judicial review. It is
therefore important to consider whether the benefits of my proposal would
outweigh its costs.
B. DEUBERA TIONABOUTDELIBERATIONAND THE DEEPER WISDOM OFHARD-LOOK
REVIEW
Deliberative democratic theory does not claim that more deliberation
always improves a decision-making process. Rather, deliberative democratic
theory requires that the decision-making procedures that are adopted must
be justifiable from a deliberative perspective.243 If it turns out that less
deliberative procedures would, under some circumstances, lead to more
justifiable and legitimate outcomes, those procedures should be adopted
under deliberative democratic theory.244 It is therefore necessary to consider
whether the foregoing proposal to revise administrative law to provide more
space for political reasons in agency decision making would truly be
beneficial. If not, we should ultimately retain and affirmatively embrace the
existing version of hard-look judicial review based on the principles of
deliberative democratic theory.
The primary benefits of providing more space for political reasons in
agency decision making pursuant to the foregoing proposal would be the
increased transparency of the administrative process, and the potential to
improve the alignment between agency decision making and public opinion
or the philosophy and priorities of the existing political leadership, without
sacrificing the quality or legitimacy of agency policy choices. As Professor
Watts points out, if agencies are encouraged to provide political reasons for
their policy decisions in appropriate circumstances, they will be less likely to
manipulate their scientific or technical conclusions to reach a result that was
driven primarily by political considerations.45 Moreover, when agencies
expressly rely on legitimate political considerations, such as public opinion
or the sitting President's philosophy or priorities, to choose from among two
or more roughly equal alternatives when the best course of action cannot be
followed, democratic accountability is enhanced because other
243. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at 3 ("[N]ot all issues, all the time, require
deliberation. Deliberative democracy makes room for many other forms of decision-making
(including bargaining among groups, and secret operations ordered by executives), as long as
the use of these forms themselves is justified at some point in a deliberative process.");
Gutmann, supra note 50, at 17-18 ("We even need to deliberate in order to know when not to
deliberate.").
244. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 35, at I13 (emphasizing the possibility of
questioning "from within deliberative theory, whether deliberation is justifiable-and what it
entails").
245. Watts, supra note 2, at 40-41.
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governmental officials and interested members of the public can better
understand and evaluate the rationale for the agency's decision.246 The
requirement that agencies disclose a summary of the relevant
communications between public officials and agency decision makers would
greatly improve the democratic accountability of the administrative process
for similar reasons.2 47
While the preceding benefits would be largely procedural or systemic,
the State Farm two-step could also improve the quality of agency decision
making. When an agency's assessment of the best course of action is
infeasible, and there are two or more roughly equal alternatives, the most
justifiable policy decision on the merits is likely to be the one that is
supported by public opinion or the philosophy and priorities of the
Administration. Not only does deliberative democratic theory embrace these
considerations when the resulting decision was preceded by an adequate
deliberative process and is justifiable on the merits, but any other basis for
making the final policy decision (such as flipping a coin) would seem
arbitrary or capricious under these circumstances.
The foregoing proposal also has fewer drawbacks than previous efforts
to give politics a place in agency rulemaking.48 First, it provides a coherent
understanding of the potential benefits of an agency's reliance on political
considerations in appropriate circumstances, as well as the fundamental
limitations on the ability of political reasons to justify agency decision
making. Second, while the foregoing proposal would not necessarily result
in the disclosure of the real political reasons behind the White House's efforts
to convince agencies to adopt particular positions, this is not an
overwhelming problem for deliberative democratic theory, which "is
premised on a conviction that it is more productive to debate the merits of
particular policy choices, rather than trying to ascertain or impugn the
motives of those who have taken a position."49 It would be nice if public
officials provided the real reasons for their policy positions, "but insincerity
246. Cf Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1177 ("More disclosure would enable the public to
react to political reasons and to better register its views on which ones are sufficient to justify a
particular agency decision."); Watts, supra note 2, at 42-45 ("Encouraging agencies to disclose
political factors rather than hiding behind technocratic facades would enable more political
influences to come out into the open, thereby enabling greater political accountability and
monitoring."). Professor Watts also claims that her proposal would be beneficial because it
would improve the fit between administrative law doctrine and political-control theories of
agency legitimacy and give courts another reason to defer to agency decision making. Id. at 33-
42. I do not necessarily perceive either of these results as beneficial. See supra Part II (criticizing
political-control theory and its implications). The State Farm two-step is therefore not intended
to alter the extent to which courts defer to agency decision making but rather to revise the
analytical framework that is used by agencies and courts to make and review administrative
policy decisions.
247. SeeMendelson, supra note 5, at 1163-64; supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part II.C (criticizing Mendelson's and Watts's proposals on various grounds).
249. Staszewski, supra note 39, at 1289.
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does not eliminate our ability to evaluate the merits of their choices or the
explanations they have provided to justify them," and "insincere
justifications are more likely to be vulnerable to criticism."25o Third, the
foregoing proposal would not shield agency inaction from meaningful
judicial review or facilitate regulatory capture. On the contrary, the State
Farm two-step would likely provide a useful new analytical framework for
policy decisions of this nature. Under the first step of the analysis, the
agency would need to make a decision regarding the best course of action
on the merits under the circumstances. This means that an agency should
explain whether it believes that the requested action is appropriate based on
its statutory authority and the best available information. If the agency
concludes that the requested action is inappropriate, its decision should be
reviewed on the merits under the existing version of the arbitrary and
capricious standard. The agency may decide, however, that while it would
like to proceed with the requested action, it cannot do so at the present time
because of limitations on its statutory authority or its available resources. If
an agency adopts this latter course of action, a court should evaluate the
reasonableness of the decision, which could include issues of statutory
interpretation,2 5' as well as an analysis of specifically how the agency plans to
pursue its programmatic responsibilities in light of its existing budgetary
resources. Legitimate political considerations, such as the ascertainable
preferences of elected officials or the general public, would only be relevant
to inform this latter inquiry. Not only would such an analytical framework
limit arbitrary agency action and facilitate a more meaningful discussion of
the merits of an agency's priorities and decisions regarding when to take
action, but it would also place the views and interests of regulated entities
and regulatory beneficiaries on more even footing during the administrative
process, and therefore promote the goals of deliberative democratic
theory.52
The real question from the standpoint of implementation is whether
the State Farm two-step would create overwhelming line-drawing or slippery-
slope problems for either agencies or courts.253 This is a serious-and
perhaps overwhelming-problem for any proposal to give politics a limited
space in agency decision making because most policy questions involve legal,
technical, and political considerations that cannot easily be disentangled, as
well as questions of value.254 In contrast to other proposals, the State Farm
two-step has coherent theoretical underpinnings that provide "intelligible
250. Id.
251. The appropriate standard of judicial review of questions of agency statutory
interpretation is beyond the scope of this Article.
252. See supra Part III.A.
253. My remaining criticisms of Mendelson's and Watts's proposals do not apply to the State
Farm two-step. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
254. See generally EDLEY, supra note 7, at 98- 05.
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principles" for ascertaining which political considerations are legitimate,
and when they should be allowed to justify an agency's policy decisions.255
Nonetheless, political reasons are inherently unruly, my proposed analytical
framework is intricate and potentially malleable, and many public officials
are not devotees of deliberative democratic theory. Accordingly, there are
still good reasons to worry that the resulting judicial doctrine will be
arbitrary or, even worse, that courts will simply open the floodgates to the
politicization of administrative agencies. Moreover, there is still a potential
concern that this proposal to give politics a place could, in practice,
periodically allow political considerations to trump an agency's considered
judgment regarding the best manner of implementing its statutory authority
on the merits.
These possibilities raise more fundamental concerns based on the
underlying reality that political considerations will inevitably play a
substantial role in agency decision making as a result of the existing
methods of political control.256 There is little need to provide administrative
agencies with further incentives to take political reasons into account in
their decision making. On the contrary, we should be striving to develop
structural mechanisms to encourage agencies to engage in reasoned
deliberation about the best ways to implement their statutory authority on
the merits. The existing version of hard-look judicial review, which instructs
agencies to "explain their decisions in technocratic, statutory, or
scientifically driven terms, not political terms,"257 is administrative law's most
important tool for serving this very purpose. We would therefore risk losing
something dear if the arbitrary and capricious standard was altered in any
way that would dilute this message and open the door for agencies to justify
their policy decisions based on political considerations.
The first concern is that if we openly embrace political reasons in
agency decision making, political considerations would be more likely to
predominate agency decision making and thereby undermine the
underlying goals of many statutory programs. While the State Farm two-step is
specifically designed to mitigate this concern, there is still a legitimate
possibility that any such reform would be the equivalent of opening
Pandora's box. A second related concern is that openly embracing political
reasons in agency decision making could alter the accepted role of
administrators, and their own self-identities, in very damaging ways.2s8 If
255. See generally supra Part W.A.
256. See Lipton, supra note 212, at 2103 ("What emerges from the political science research
... is that government bureaucrats routinely balance political forces, even when making very
informal decisions, at all levels of government.").
257. Watts, supra note 2, at 5.
258. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should judges Care?, 60
STAN. L. REV. 155, 16o (2007) (discussing the concept of "institutional morality" or "role
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administrators can no longer always realistically be viewed as the repositories
of neutral expertise, they can be understood as public servants who are
charged with engaging in reasoned deliberation about the best ways of
implementing their delegated statutory authority and thereby promoting the
public good. They should not be viewed as political flunkies, whose only job
is to implement the directives of elected officials, powerful interest groups,
or a majority of citizens, regardless of the substantive merits of a policy
dispute.259 Once again, the State Farm two-step plainly envisions the former
role rather than the latter role for agency officials, but it does send the
message that political reasons can be legitimate considerations, rather than
something that should generally be resisted. This message is accurate in
theory, but it may become difficult for public officials to cabin the role of
politics in practice, and it may therefore ultimately be preferable to continue
to send the message that political considerations should be kept off the table
when agencies make policy decisions. Finally, political considerations will
generally be more pressing for appointed (and removable) agency heads than
for the professional staff and civil servants who devote their careers to
studying the best ways of implementing an agency's statutory authority and
achieving its programmatic responsibilities..6o It is therefore conceivable that
any proposal that openly embraces political reasons in agency decision
making would give politically appointed officials within agencies even more
power over the career staff and civil servants who are most likely to possess
technical expertise and to engage in reasoned deliberation about the best
ways to solve our most difficult collective problems. In contrast, the existing
version of hard-look judicial review has a tendency to empower an agency's
professional staff and career civil servants relative to its politically appointed
leadership.26 , Accordingly, revising administrative law doctrine to give
greater weight to political considerations in agency decision making could
change the internal dynamics within agencies in ways that would ultimately
prove harmful to the goals of deliberative democratic theory.
At the end of the day, then, we are left with a choice. On the one hand,
we could adopt the State Farm two-step and revise administrative law in ways
that would improve the transparency of agency decision making, recognize
morality," which reflects "the particular moral principles associated with particular social
roles"); see also id. at 178-79.
259. Cf Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in ajar: Reason and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 7o FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 21 (2001) ("[A] retreat to political will or
intuition is almost always unavailable to modem American administrative decisionmakers....
[S]uch claims delegitimate administrative action rather than count as good reasons.").
26o. See Seidenfeld, supra note 36, at 1554-58 (describing the professional rather than the
political nature of the bureaucratic staff).
261. Cf Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1051-55, 1065-67 (2011) (explaining that administrative law allocates power within
agencies, as well as among institutions, and discussing the implications of hard-look judicial
review and Massachusetts v. EPA on the distribution of power within agencies).
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an appropriate role for legitimate political considerations within the
administrative process, and likely produce more candid explanations for an
agency's policy decisions that better reflect its actual decision-making
process when an agency is behaving in normatively desirable ways.22 On the
other hand, we could maintain the status quo on the grounds that reserving
a place for politics in agency decision making sends the wrong message, and
that even the best conceivable reform proposal is unduly vulnerable to
unintended consequences that could ultimately prove detrimental to the
dual projects of legitimizing administrative authority and promoting
deliberative democracy. My sense is that we should probably maintain the
status quo at this time because the line-drawing problems associated with the
State Farm two-step and the risk that such a proposal would result in the over-
politicization of agency decision making are simply too great. We should
also recognize, however, that the existing version of hard-look judicial review
is not some outdated or naive relic of New Deal thinking about the
regulatory state, but rather a sophisticated and perhaps brilliant mechanism
for promoting reasoned deliberation by administrative agencies, and
thereby helping to ensure that their discretionary policy choices are
democratically legitimate. This, of course, means that we should flatly reject
other recent proposals to give politics a place in agency decision making that
are based on the political control model of administrative legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
The proper role of political reasons in agency decision making has
tremendous practical and theoretical importance in administrative law. The
conventional wisdom has been that an agency's policy decisions should be
justified based on their substantive merits, rather than the preferences of
elected officials or other political considerations. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has recently been evenly divided on this issue, and several prominent
commentators have relied on political control models of administrative
legitimacy to argue that political reasons should play a larger and more
transparent role in agency decision making and that the judiciary should
give agencies credit for justifying their policy choices on some political
grounds.
This Article has argued that those scholarly proposals are fundamentally
misguided because political-control theories of administrative law are based
on untenable conceptions of democracy and implausible empirical
assumptions. While deliberative theories of administrative legitimacy provide
a superior alternative, deliberative democratic theorists have not provided a
clear account of the proper role of political preferences in agency decision
making. After providing such an account, this Article set forth a concrete
proposal for reforming administrative law that would improve the
262. Thanks to Sid Shapiro for bringing this latter point to my attention.
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transparency of the administrative process and allow agencies to incorporate
political considerations into their decision making, consistent with the basic
principles of deliberative democratic theory. This Article also identified
several reasons to be wary of any reform proposal that would embrace a
greater role for political reasons in agency decision making and concluded
that the best way of promoting agency legitimacy and deliberative
democracy may be to retain the existing version of the arbitrary and
capricious standard ofjudicial review.
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